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1. INTRODUCTION 
The human reproductive process is fragile; it is highly sensitive 
and, unfortunately, often works imperfectly. An estimated ten 
percent of couples attempting to parent children are infertile.1 For 
every 3,000,000 births per year in the United States there are 
450,000 to 600,000 spontaneous abortions and 33,000 fetuses die in 
utero.~ Of live births, about ten percent are premature/ approxi-
mately seven percent have a low birth weight,4 and another three 
to seven percent have congenital anomalies.5 The cause of the 
anomaly is unknown for sixty-five to seventy percent of the 
1 See L. SPEROFF, R. GLASS, & N. KASE, CUNICAL GYNECOLOGIC ENDOCRINOLOGY & 
INFERTiliTY 467 (3d ed. 1983). 
, GUIDEUNES FOR STUDIES OF HUMAN POPULATIONS EXPOSED TO MUTAGENIC AND 
REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS 71 (A. Bloom ed. 1981) (450,000); Fabro, Reproductive Tox-
icology: State of the Art, 1982, 4 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 391 (1983) (600,000). Cf Carr & 
Gedeon, Population Cytogenetics of Human Abortuses, in POPULATION CYTOGENETICS 
1-9 (E. Hook & I. Porter eds. 1977) (as many as 60% of all conceptions end in spontaneous 
abortion). According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 1979,32,969 fetuses 
died in utero. NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISEASE STATISTICS, 2A Vital Statistics of the U.S. 
(1979), § 3, at 2 (1983) (table 3-2) [hereinafter cited as VITAL STATISTICS]. 
3 Fabro, supra note 2, at 291. 
4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 356 
(1983). "Of all infant deaths, two-thirds occur in those weighing less than 5.5 pounds (2500 
grams) at birth. Infants below this weight are more than 20 times as likely to die within 
the first year. Low birth weight is sometimes associated with increased occurrence of 
mental retardation, birth defects, growth and development problems, blindness, autism, 
cerebral palsy and epilepsy." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION 
AND DISEASE PREVENTION 24 (1979). 
5 Fabro, supra note 2, at 291. 
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cases.6 About 30,000 babies per year die during the neonatal 
period and at least 15,000 die in the first year.7 
Although environmental factors are known to be responsible for 
only a small percentage of congenital anomalies,s there is over-
whelming evidence that exposure to certain occupational hazards 
can result in a variety of negative reproductive effects. Among 
these effects are altered fertility, chromosomal abnormalities, 
spontaneous abortions, congenital malformations, behavioral dis-
orders, and malignancies.9 Among the numerous substances· and 
agents commonly in use in industry known to cause negative 
reproductive effects are arsenic, benzene, cadmium, formal-
dehyde, lead, mercury, radiation, and vinyl chloride.1O 
Even though exposure to reproductive hazards by male as well 
as female employees may result in negative reproductive out-
comes, some large companies have instituted policies excluding 
only fertile or pregnant women from employment where there is 
exposure. 11 A major reason for these policies is the fear that a 
child born with birth defects might bring a tort action against the 
employer and, presumably, this is more likely where the exposed 
parent was the mother.12 
A great deal has been written about the legal issues surround-
ing claims of sex discrimination related to these exclusionary 
policies and about the possible tort actions that could be main-
tained against employersY Very little has been written, however, 
6 Wilson, Environmental Effects on Development Teratology, in 2 PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 
OF GESTATION 269-320 (Assili ed. 1972). It has been estimated that 20% of birth defects 
are caused by known genetic transmission, 5% by chromosomal aberration, and 6-100/0 
by environmental factors (e.g., radiation, infections, maternal metabolic imbalance, and 
drugs and environmental chemicals). Id. 
7 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 2, § 2, at 4 (table 2-4). 
" See Wilson, supra note 6. 
9 Sever, Reproductive Hazards of the Workplace, 23 J. OCCUP. MED. 685, 686 (1981). 
\0 Messite & Bond, Reproductive Toxicology and Occupational Exposure, in DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 64-69 (C. Zenz ed. 1980). In addition, each year 
about 1,000 new chemicals are introduced into American industry. For most of the 63,000 
chemicals in common use in this country there is little or no information concerning 
their effects on reproduction. See Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect The Fetus: The 
Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 
69 GEO. L.J. 641, 661 (1981), and authorities cited therein. 
11 M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 77 (1984). 
12 I d. at 184-87. 
13 See generally Crowell & Copus, Safety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and Title VII 
Clash Over Health Hazards in the Workplace, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 567 (1978); Finneran, 
Title VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women, 31 LAB. L.J. 223 (1980); 
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 
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about the legal issues involved in the regulation of reproductive 
hazards. 
This Article will analyze current regulations governing reprod-
uctive hazards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. It 
will also consider gov~rnmental research efforts and possible new 
regulations for dealing with reproductive hazards. Because the 
regulatory process involves numerous controversial policy 
choices, the Article includes interviews with current and former 
government officials. 
Any new standards attempting to regulate occupational expo-
sures to reproductive hazards must navigate the tortuous 
standards-promulgation process under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act. The process is slow, difficult, and adversarial and 
the judicial review of new standards can further complicate the 
process. This Article analyzes the legal and political obstacles to 
effective regulation of reproductive hazards in the workplace. In 
so doing, it explores the broader problem of the need to simplify 
and expedite rule making under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act. 
II. CURRENT REGULATION OF REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS UNDER 
OSHA 
The first part of the Article discusses OSHA's present ability to 
regulate reproductive hazards. It begins with a discussion of the 
ways in which health hazards, in general, have been regulated. 
This is followed by a review of the current regulations specifically 
covering reproductive hazards. Finally, there is a discussion of 
the possible use of the general duty clause as a way of prohibiting 
harmful exposures to reproductive hazards in the absence of a 
specific OSHA standard. 
1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA L. REV. 
63 (1980); Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Em-
ployment Rights of Women, 129 D. PA. L. REV. 798 (1981); Williams, supra note 10; Note, 
Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1113 (1977); 
Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or Dis-
crimination?, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 97 (1978); Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental 
Exposure to Workplace Hazards: the Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 
D_ MICH. J. L. REF. 237 (1979). 
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A. General Requirements of OSHA Health Standards 
Under Section 6(a) of the Act l4 the Secretary was initially au-
thorized to adopt "established federal standards"15 and "national 
consensus standards"16 without resort to the lengthy rule making 
procedures of Section 6(b)17 or the Administrative Procedure Act.18 
This authority, which expired after two years (in 1973) was in-
cluded in the Act to assure that workers would be protected as 
soon as possible after the Act's effective date in 1971. 
In 1971, pursuant to Section 6(a), OSHA adopted as standards 
the 450 threshold limit values (TL V's), 19 developed by the Amer-
ican Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 
in 1968 and which became "established federal standards" when 
they were previously adopted under the Walsh-Healey Act.~o The 
ACGIH set limits on the maximum concentrations for employee 
exposure to certain airborne contaminants, but did not otherwise 
specify monitoring or medical examinations. 
For the most part, these standards have not been updated by 
OSHA. Pursuant to Section 6(b) rule making, however, twenty-two 
new health standards have been promulgated. These new health 
standards require employers to undertake a variety of preventive 
14 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). 
15 Section 3(10), 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976), defines "established federal standard" as 
"any occupational safety and health standard established by any agency of the United 
States and presently in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December 
29, 1970." 
16 Section 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976), defines "national consensus standard" as 
any occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) 
has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-
producing organization under procedures whereby it can be determined by the 
Secretary that persons interested and affected by the scope of provisions of the 
standard have reached substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formu-
lated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be consid-
ered and (3) has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after 
consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies. 
17 5 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). For a further discussion of § 6(b) rulemaking, see infra text 
and notes at notes 153-68. 
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
19 A threshold limit value (TLV) represents the maximum time weighted average 
concentration to which a healthy worker may be exposed for a normal 40-hour week, up 
to eight hours a day, over a working lifetime (40-50 years) without becoming ill. See 
ACG IH, THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES FOR CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND PHYSICAL AGENTS 
IN THE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE INDICES WITH INTENDED 
CHANGES FOR 1984-85, at 2-3 (1984); Steinberg,ACGIH TLV's and the Sensitive Worker, 3 
ANNALS AM. CONF. GOVTL. INDUS. HYGIENISTS 77 (1982). 
"0 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976). 
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measures beyond simply specifying permissible exposure levels. 
Some of these requirements are set forth below. 
1. Environmental Monitoring 
The first responsibility of the employer is to conduct periodic 
atmospheric tests to determine the presence and concentration of 
hazardous substances. The standards differ on the required fre-
quency of the testing, but even the most stringent requirements 
have been upheld. For example, in Marshall v. Western Electric, 
Inc./ 1 the Second Circuit reversed the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission (Commission) and held that an em-
ployer must monitor every operation in which vinyl chloride was 
released, regardless of the employer's prediction that only neglig-
ible concentrations of the gas were released. In Duquesne Light 
CO.,22 the Commission held, however, in a highly questionable 
decision, that the asbestos standard does not require monitoring 
where employees are not regularly exposed during the course of 
work, even though their sporadic exposures sometimes exceeded 
the standard. In Dunlop v. Rockwell International,23 a citation was 
vacated because the employer had retained an independent test-
ing laboratory to conduct atmospheric tests, even though those 
tests failed to discover the employer's excess levels of asbestos 
fibers. 
OSHA's newer health standards have relied on the concept of 
an "action level." For example, in the ethylene oxide standard24 
OSHA established a one part per million (ppm) eight-hour time 
weighted average (TWA) as the exposure limit. The action level 
was set at 0.5 ppm. When initial monitoring reveals exposures 
below the action level, no further monitoring is required unless 
there is a change in production, process, or control. If exposures 
are above the action level, exposures must be monitored twice per 
year. (See Table 1). Monitoring may be discontinued, however, if 
there are two consecutive measurements, taken at least seven 
days apart, that show exposures below the action level. 
The ethylene oxide standard's preamble contains the following 
table indicating the environmental monitoring requirements. 
21 565 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
22 11 OSHC 2033, 1984 OSHD ~ 26,959 (1984). The holding may well lead to a lack of 
protection for construction, maintenance, and other employees whose exposures to toxic 
substances are not on a "regular" basis. 
:!3 540 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. 1976). 
24 29 C.F.R § 1910.1047 (1984). 
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TABLE 1. 
FREQUENCY OF MONITORING REQUIRED UNDER THE 
ETHYLENE OXIDE ST ANDARD~5 
633 
Exposure Scenario Required Monitoring Activity 
Below the action level 
At or above the action 
level, but at or 
below the TWA 
Above the TWA 
No monitoring required 
Monitor exposures 2 times 
per year 
Monitor exposures 4 times 
per year 
The action level attempts to provide a margin of safety, so that it 
is unlikely that a minor fluctuation in exposure would exceed the 
TWA. It requires employers to monitor exposures approaching 
the TWA to ensure that the TWA is not exceeded, while removing 
the burden of continuous environmental monitoring from em-
ployers with only slight exposure levels. 
The main problem with the use of the action level concept is 
that it eliminates important protections for workers whose expo-
sures are below the action level. For example, in Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, the "benzene 
case,"26 the United States Supreme Court was critical of OSHA for 
not requiring monitoring and medical testing of employees who 
were subject to exposures below the action level. 
By doing SO, it could keep a constant check on the validity of 
the assumptions made in developing the permissible expo-
sure limit, giving it a sound evidentiary basis for decreasing 
the limit if it was initially set too high. Moreover, in this way 
it could ensure that workers who were unusually susceptible 
to benzene could be removed from exposure before they had 
suffered any permanent damage.27 
A similar problem exists under the lead standard, which estab-
lished a permissible exposure limit (PEL) of fifty micrograms of 
lead per cubic meter of air averaged over an eight-hour work day 
and an action level of thirty micrograms. An employer must 
supply protective clothing, change rooms, showers, and other 
hygiene facilities only if the exposure level is above the action 
leveP8 Thus, the children of workers exposed to levels of lead 
below the action level could be at risk from lead-contaminated 
clothing brought home by their parents. 
~5 49 Fed. Reg. 25,776 (1984). 
26 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
27 Id. at 658 (footnotes omitted). 
28 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(g) and (i) (1984). 
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2. Biological Monitoring 
Some OSHA health standards require the biological monitoring 
of exposed employees to measure the body's uptake of toxic sub-
stances. For example, the lead standard requires that the em-
ployer provide blood sampling and analysis for lead and zinc 
protoporphyrin levels for each employee with lead exposure at or 
above the action level. This monitoring is required at least every 
six months.29 
3. Medical Surveillance 
OSHA health standards regulating toxic substances require a 
variety of medical procedures. In general, employers must con-
duct pre-placement examinations; the physician must furnish 
employers with a copy of the physician's statement of suitability 
for employment in the regulated area; the employer must conduct 
periodic (usually annual) examinations; and in some instances, 
the employer must conduct examinations at termination of em-
ployment. The failure to conduct these required medical exam-
inations may lead to the issuance of OSHA citations and the 
assessment of penalties. The following table contains a summary 
of the specific requirements. 
TABLE 2. 
MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS OF OSHA HEALTH STANDARDS REGULATING TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES 
29 C.F.R. Substance 
1910.1001 Asbestos 
1910.1003 13 carcinogens 
to .1016 
1910.1017 Vinyl chloride 
Primary Health 
Risks 
1. Asbestosis 
2. Mesothelioma 
3. Lung Disorders 
1. Bladder cancer 
2. Bronchiogenic 
cancer 
3. Lung cancer 
4. Stomach cancer 
5. Skin cancer 
6. Liver cancer 
7. Kidney cancer 
8. Pulmonary edema 
9. Central necrosis 
1. Angiosarcoma 
2. Lung cancer 
Required Medical 
Procedures 
1. Pulmonary function 
tests 
2. Chest x·rays 
1. Complete medical 
history, including 
genetic and environ-
mental factors. 
2. Consideration of 
reduced immunologi-
cal competence of 
employees, those 
undergoing treatment 
with steroids or 
cytotoxic agents, 
pregnant women and 
cigarette smokers. 
1. Complete physical 
exam 
2. Liver studies 
1985] OSHA RULE MAKING 635 
29 C.F.R. Substance Primary Health Required Medical 
Risks Procedures 
1910.1018 Inorganic 1. Neuritis 1. Complete medical 
arsenic 2. Paralysis history and exam 
2. Chest x-ray 
3. Sputum cytology 
1910.1025 Inorganic lead 1. Central nervous 1. Complete medical 
system disorders history and exam 
2. Kidney damage 2. Detailed blood 
studies 
1910.1029 Coke oven 1. Lung cancer 1. Complete medical 
emissions history 
2. Kidney cancer 2. Chest x-ray 
3. Skin cancer 3. Pulmonary function 
tests 
4. Sputum ~ytology 
5. Urine cytology 
1910.1043 Cotton dust 1. Byssinosis 1. Complete medical 
history 
2. Standardized 
respiratory 
questionnaire 
3. Pulmonary function 
tests 
1910.1044 DBCP 1. Sterility 1. Complete medical and 
reproductive history 
2. Examination of 
genito-urinary tract 
3. Serum specimen for 
radioimmunoassay 
1910.1045 Acrylonitrile 1. Asphyxia 1. Complete medical 
2. Weakness history and exam, 
with particular 
attention to 
peripheral and 
central nervous 
system, gastro-
intestinal system, 
skin, and thyroid 
2. Chest x-ray 
3. Fecal occult blood 
screening for all 
workers over 40 
years of age 
1910.1047 Ethylene oxide 1. Leukemia 1. Complete medical 
2. Brain cancer history and exam 
3. Stomach cancer 2. Complete blood 
4. Central nervous count 
system disorders 
5. Reproductive 
harms 
Source: Adapted from' M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 20-21 
(1984). 
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OSHA medical surveillance programs have two primary pur-
poses: (1) to give the employee notice of any adverse health effects 
that he or she may have suffered so that proper medical attention 
may be obtained and precautionary measures taken, and (2) to 
provide OSHA and NIOSH with data for research purposes.30 In 
implementing medical surveillance programs, the follo",-i.ng ques-
tions have arisen: 
a. What employees are covered by the medical surveillance 
provisions? 
As mentioned earlier, some standards require medical surveil-
lance only for employees exposed at or above the action level. 
Other standards require medical surveillance for all employees 
exposed to any levels of the substance. Even these more stringent 
requirements have been upheld. In GAF Corp. v. OSHRC,31 the 
D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the Commission's holding that the 
employer was required to provide medical examinations for all 
employees exposed to asbestos - including employees whose ex-
posures were below the PEL. In Duquesne Light CO.,32 however, 
the Commission held that the asbestos standard did not require 
medical examinations of employees who were not regularly ex-
posed, even though their sporadic exposures sometimes exceeded 
the standard. The coke oven, arsenic, and ethylene oxide stan-
dards require medical surveillance for employees exposed at least 
thirty days per year. 
In the ethylene oxide standard OSHA rejected the recommen-
dation of the American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees (AFSCME) and the AFL-CIO that medical surveil-
lance should be provided to all formerly exposed employees as 
well as those presently exposed. According to OSHA, this recom-
mendation was rejected because the present state of knowledge 
about ethylene oxide's long-term effects on humans is inadequate 
and that only employees at a late stage in developing leukemia 
could be identified. The coke oven emissions standard, however, 
does require continued surveillance of previously exposed em-
ployees who have been reassigned by the same or a successor 
employer.33 
"9 ld. § 1910.10250)(2). 
31l B. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 131 (1984). 
31 561 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
3" 11 OSHC 2033, 1984 OSHD ~ 26,959 (1984). 
33 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(j)(3)(iii) (1984). 
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b. Are medical examinations mandatory? 
Section 6(b)(7) of the Act provides that medical examinations 
shall "be made available" to exposed employees. OSHA has inter-
preted this language to mean that the employer must offer the 
examination; the employee may refuse to take the examination.34 
The coke oven emissions standard contains a provision requiring 
employers to inform employees of the health consequences of 
refusing to take the examination and requiring a signed state-
ment by the employee that the consequences have been explained 
and understood.35 
The detailed medical removal protection (MRP) and rate reten-
tion (RR) provisions of the lead standard were promulgated, in 
part, as an alternative to mandatory worker participation in the 
medical surveillance program.36 The preamble to the lead stan-
dard indicates that OSHA rejected the idea of making exam-
inations mandatory because employees concerned about job secu-
rity might be tempted to use chelating drugs and to conceal 
subjective symptoms oflead disease.37 By contrast, with MRP and 
RR, workers would be encouraged to participate, but those who 
chose not to - because of privacy or religious objections or for 
other reasons - would not be required. 
The only time OSHA attempted to make medical surveillance 
mandatory was in the commercial diving standard, which was 
issued in 1977 and struck down two years later by the Fifth 
Circuit in Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Depart-
ment of Labor.38 OSHA reasoned that the safety of other dive 
team members can depend on the health of an individual diver.39 
The multiple-physician review procedure, discussed in detail be-
low, also was included in the diving standard to ensure that divers 
would not be denied their employment on the basis of a single 
medical examination mandated by OSHA. 
The preceding discussion of the "optional" nature of OSHA-
required medical examinations does not mean that adverse con-
sequences will not attach when an employee refuses to undergo 
examination. Simply because OSHA does not require participa-
34 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 134. 
3" 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(j)(1)(iii) (1984). 
36 For a further discussion, see infra text and notes at notes 295-309. 
31 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952, 52,973-74 (1978). 
38 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979). 
39 42 Fed. Reg. 37,656-57 (1977). 
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tion, however, does not mean that it protects a refusal to partici-
pate. Unless covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, an employer may make cooperation with medical ex-
aminations a valid condition of employment.40 Thus, as a practical 
matter, most "optional" OSHA medical examination provisions 
are, in fact, mandatory for employees. 
c. What procedures are required? 
OSHA's health standards prescribe the specific medical proce-
dures required during OSHA-mandated medical examinations. 
The argument has been made that broader latitude should be 
given to the exammmg physician by adopting more 
performance-oriented standards. This would allow physicians to 
change their practices quickly to comport with the latest medical 
developments. In rejecting this argument in the ethylene oxide 
standard, OSHA's preamble noted that mandatory requirements 
help smaller employers with less established medical depart-
ments to determine the appropriate examination protocols. 
Even without a separate health standard specifying the par-
ticulars of a medical surveillance program, the Oceupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission may impose an appropri-
ate medical surveillance program as an alternative measure dur-
ing the extended period of time requested in a petition for mod-
ification of abatement (PMA). In ITT Grinnell,41 the employer was 
cited for having excessive levels of silica dust. The employer filed a 
PMA to extend the abatement date, which the Commission 
granted conditioned on the employer's use of additional medical 
surveillance, including chest x-rays and pulmonary function tests. 
Although OSHA prescribes the use of specific medical proce-
dures, it should be emphasized that OSHA does not prohibit the 
use of any procedures. The only exception to this principle is the 
ban on the use of prophylactic chelation in the lead standard.4:! 
d. How are test results interpreted? 
Accurate medical assessments often depend on thorough medi-
cal histories, clinical evaluations, and laboratory procedures. Al-
though OSHA health standards promulgated after the asbestos 
40 M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 88. 
'1 11 OSHC 1464, 1983 OSHD ~ 26,530 (1983), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
744 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1984). 
,~ 29 C.F.R. 1910.1025(j)(4) (1984). 
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standard (OSHA's first health standard promulgated after 
rule making) have contained appendices with medical surveillance 
guidelines,43 only the lead standard and cotton dust standard 
provide detailed guidance for physicians. The medical surveil-
lance guidelines published with the proposed ethylene oxide stan-
dard recommended the use of cytogenetic monitoring of workers 
to detect chromosomal aberrations.44 This recommendation was 
not included when the final version of the standard was promul-
gated.45 
e. Who selects the physician? 
The Act does not specifically indicate whether the employer or 
employee has the right to select a physician to perform medical 
examinations. In promulgating the asbestos standard OSHA de-
termined that the employer should have the option of choosing 
the physician and should have access to the results of the exam-
ination.46 The D.C. Circuit upheld OSHA's position in Industrial 
Union Department v. HodgsonY This policy has been followed in 
subsequent health standards. 
A notable exception concerns the "multiple physician review" 
procedure, first used in the commercial diving standard. The 
standard required medical examinations of employees who were 
to be exposed to hyperbaric conditions. If the employee was found 
to be unfit by the examining physician selected by the employer, 
the employee could seek a second opinion. If the first two physi-
cians disagreed, a third physician was to be selected by the first 
two physicians and that physician's determination would be dis-
positive. All costs were to be borne by the employer. 
In Taylor,48 the Fifth Circuit struck down this provision. The 
court, citing its decision in American Petroleum Institute v. 
OSHA,49 held that the standard was not "reasonably necessary or 
43 Vinyl chloride, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 App. A (1984); arsenic, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 App. 
C (1984); lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 App. C (1984); coke oven emissions, 29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1029 App. B (1984); cotton dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 Apps. B,C,D (1984); DBCP, 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.1044 App. B (1984); acrylonitrile, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045 App. C (1984); 
ethylene oxide, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1047 App. C (1984). 
44 48 Fed. Reg. 17,315 (1983). 
4.5 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734 (1984). 
46 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 136. 
47 Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
46 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979). 
49 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't V. American 
Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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appropriate to provide safe or healthful workplaces." The court 
concluded that the standard imposed a mandatory job security 
provision controlled by the third physician. "[T]he employer has 
no control over the third doctor's fitness standards, so that the 
employer is prevented from setting higher health standards for 
employees than the secondary examining doctors choose to set."50 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,5! the D.C. Circuit 
reached the opposite result and upheld the multiple physician 
review procedure of the lead standard. According to the court, the 
provision is authorized by Section 6(b)(7)'s broad mandate to re-
quire examinations that can "most effectively determine" a 
threat to worker health. In addition, the provision is reasonable in 
light of two findings supported by the record. First, lead diseases 
are often difficult to diagnose and multiple physician review in-
creases the chances of a correct diagnosis. Second, some company 
physicians have engaged in the unsound and harmful practice of 
prophylactic chelation to reduce the blood-lead levels of employ-
ees. The court distinguished Taylor, where employees would seek 
multiple physician review to obtain a finding of fitness, thus 
forcing the employer to retain employees considered unfit by its 
own physician and standards. In the lead standard, the multiple 
physician review procedure was to prevent excess exposure of 
"leaded" employees and, together with the medical removal pro-
tection, the employer is not precluded from imposing more strin-
gent health standards. 
In the ethylene oxide standard OSHA adopted the position 
taken by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) that multiple physician review was unnecessary 
for ethylene oxide.5~ 
f. Who pays for the examination? 
Section 6(b)(7) of the Act makes it clear that medical exam-
inations shall be made available "by the employer or at his cost." 
OSHA's health standards have included language indicating that 
all costs for medical examinations must be borne by the employer. 
In Phelps Dodge Corp .,53 the Commission held that a provision in 
the inorganic arsenic standard providing that medical exam-
50 599 F.2d at 625. 
51 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
52 49 Fed. Reg. 25,788-89 (1984). 
53 11 OSHC 1441, 1983 OSHD ~ 26,552 (1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1984). 
1985] OSHA RULE MAKING 641 
inations be provided without cost required the employer to com-
pensate employees for time spent taking the examination (outside 
normal working hours) and for extra transportation expenses. 
The Commission's decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.54 
g. What personnel action may be taken as a result of the 
examination? 
With the exception of medical removal protection and rate re-
tention under some health standards, OSHA has not indicated 
what personnel actions may be based on OSHA-mandated medi-
cal surveillance. Consequently, unless there is an applicable pro-
vision in a collective bargaining agreement or the personnel ac-
tion otherwise violates a statutory prohibition against discrimi-
nation, such as handicap laws, an employer may refuse to hire, 
reassign, layoff, or discharge employees on the basis of medical 
surveillance. The problem of job security is one major reason why 
some employees do not cooperate fully with medical surveillance 
programs.55 
4. Controls and Other Requirements 
OSHA health standards attempt to reduce exposure through a 
variety of control strategies, such as engineering controls, work 
practice controls, personal protective equipment, and administra-
tive controls. Depending on the working conditions, employers 
may have a wide range of other duties, such as providing showers 
and changing rooms, protective clothing, and laundry facilities. 
Employers also may be obligated to post warning signs and give 
detailed warnings to their employees. Finally, OSHA standards 
require that all health hazard emergencies be reported. For ex-
ample, carcinogen exposure must be reported to OSHA within 
twenty-four hours.56 Radiation exposure must be reported imme-
diately by phone or telegram and a written report must be filed 
within fifteen days.57 
54 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1984). 
55 M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 203-04. 
56 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1003(f)(2) (1984). 
57 29 C.F.R. § 1910.96(1) (1984). 
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B. OSHA Standards Regulating Reproductive Hazards 
1. DBCP 
DBCP (1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane) is a liquid pesticide. In 
July, 1977, workers at Occidental Chemical Company in Lathrop, 
California noticed a pattern of infertility at the plant. When tests 
were performed by the University of California it was discovered 
that fourteen of thirty-eight workers tested had significantly re-
duced sperm counts.58 
On August 23, 1977, the union, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic 
Workers (OCAW), petitioned OSHA to issue an emergency tempo-
rary standard (ETS) for DBCP with a PEL of one part per billion 
(ppb). At the time of the petition, no DBCP standard had been 
adopted by OSHA. On September 9, 1977, OSHA issued an ETS 
for DBCP, establishing an eight hour TWA of ten ppb and a 
fifteen minute ceiling level of fifty ppb.59 Based on evidence that 
DBCP was a carcinogen as well as a gametotoxin, on March 17, 
1978, OSHA issued a permanent standard lowering the eight hour 
TWA to one ppb, with no ceiling limit.60 Neither the ETS nor the 
permanent standard was challenged in court. 
In addition to regulating the permissible airborne concentra-
tion of DBCP, the standard also prohibits dermal and eye contact, 
requires exposure monitoring, establishes a respirator program, 
and provides for protective clothing, change rooms, and showers. 
The medical surveillance section of the standard provides for 
pre-placement and annual examinations, which must include at 
least the following: 
(1) A medical and occupational history including reproduct-
ive history; 
(2) A physical examination, including examination of the 
genito-urinary tract, testicle size and body habitus, including 
a determination of sperm count; 
(3) A serum specimen shall be obtained and the following 
determinations made by radioimmunoassay techniques 
utilizing National Institutes of Health (NIH) specific antigen 
or one of equivalent sensitivity: (a) Serum follicle stimulating 
hormone (FSH); (b) Serum luteinizing hormone (LH); and (c) 
Serum total estrogen (females); 
58 D. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH REGULATION 108 (1982). 
59 42 Fed. Reg. 45,536 (1977). 
60 43 Fed. Reg. 11,514 (1978), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044 (1984). 
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(4) Any other tests deemed appropriate by the examining 
physician.61 
643 
The standard also provides for employee information and training 
as well as warning signs and product labels. 
2. Lead 
Unlike the DBCP standard, which was promulgated largely 
because of the negative reproductive consequences from expo-
sure, the lead standard was promulgated mostly to prevent other 
health problems, such as neurological disorders. Indeed, as dis-
cussed previously, the standard as promulgated is not sufficient 
to ensure that there will be no reproductive damage caused by 
exposure to lead. The lead standard, however, does attempt to 
minimize reproductive harms in several additional ways. 
The medical surveillance section of the standard requires the 
medical history to include reproductive problems. It also provides 
that if requested by an employee, medical examinations must 
include pregnancy testing or laboratory evaluation of male fertil-
ity.62 The standard further provides that the employer must fur-
nish a medical examination or consultation if the employee noti-
fies the employer of a desire to obtain advice concerning the 
effects of current or past exposure on his or her ability to pro-
create a healthy child.63 A final relevant provision of the standard, 
in the employee information and training section, requires the 
employer to inform all exposed employees about the medical sur-
veillance program, "including information concerning the adverse 
health effects associated with excessive exposure to lead (with 
particular attention to the adverse reproductive effects on both 
males and females)."64 
3. Ethylene Oxide 
The preamble to OSHA's ethylene oxide standard indicated 
that ethylene oxide is not only a carcinogen, but a mutagen and 
abortifacient as well. OSHA therefore concluded that ethylene 
oxide exposure at the then-current level of fifty ppm posed a 
61 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044(m)(2) (1984). 
62 Id. § 1910.1025(j)(3)(ii). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. § 1910.1025(1)(v)(D). 
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significant risk to the reproductive health of both male and fe-
male workers. 
The new standard not only lowered the PEL to one ppm, but 
included other measures designed to protect the reproductive 
health of workers. Some of these measures are identical to the 
lead standard's requirements, upon which they were based, and 
some are slightly different. As in the lead standard, employers 
must provide a medical examination or medical consultation for 
employees desiring information about the effects of current or 
past exposures on the ability to procreate a healthy child.65 As 
with lead, the medical history also includes a reproductive his-
tory.66 The physical examination, however, also must give particu-
lar attention to the reproductive system.67 Pregnancy and fertility 
testing also must be provided if the employee so requests, but only 
if the physician concurs in the need for testing.68 The preamble to 
the standard explains that the purpose of requiring the physi-
cian's concurrence for pregnancy or fertility testing is to avoid 
"abusive or frivolous" requests. OSHA cited no evidence, however, 
of such abuses under the lead standard. 
The ethylene oxide standard contains a requirement that warn-
ing signs and labels must be used. The signs and labels must 
clearly note that ethylene oxide is a cancer hazard and a repro-
ductive hazard. Employees also must be given information and 
training about ethylene oxide, including the potential for repro-
ductive harm. 
4. Other Reproductive Hazards 
OSHA standards set PEL's for a number of other substances or 
physical agents which pose reproductive hazards. Some examples 
are benzene, cadmium, mercury, vinyl chloride, and ionizing radi-
ation. For these latter hazards, however, there have been no 
efforts specifically addressed to preventing reproductive harms. 
The vinyl chloride standard, for example, was promulgated only 
after it was shown that vinyl chloride caused angiosarcoma, a 
rare cancer of the liver. Designed to reduce exposure to the lowest 
feasible limits, the standard would presumably protect against 
reproductive harms. 
6' Id. § 1910.1047(j)(2)(i)(E). 
6" Id. § 1910.1047(j)(2)(ii)(A)(1). 
67 Id. § 1910.1047(j)(2)(ii)(A)(2). 
6R Id. § 1910.1047(j)(2)(ii)(B). 
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C. General Duty Clause 
1. Overview 
Section 5(a)(1) of the Act, the "general duty clause," provides 
that each employer "shall furnish to each of his employees em-
ployment and a place of employment which are free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees."69 
Section 5(a)(1) was enacted to cover serious hazards to which no 
specific standard applies. Because Section 5(a)(l) was designed to 
augment rather than supplant standards, citation under Section 
5(a)(l) is improper where a specific standard is appropriate.70 Dur-
ing the first few years of the Act's existence the general duty 
clause was used to prohibit hazardous conduct while specific 
standards were being promulgated or before a standard's effec-
tive date.71 Subsequently, however, the general duty clause has 
been used for more peculiar violations, not covered by specific 
standards/~ 
The most distinctive and significant element of Section 5(a)(l) 
violations is that they are limited to "recognized hazards." The 
"recognition" requirement serves to ensure that cited employers 
at least have constructive knowledge of the existence of specific 
hazardous conditions. In this way, Congress sought to eliminate 
the unfairness of assessing first-instance civil penalities based on 
such a sweeping and broadly worded provision. 
As with Section 5(a)(2) violations, the relevant inquiry for de-
termining the existence of a violation is whether there are 
hazardous conditions and not whether there has been an acci-
dent.7:l Also, "recognition" refers to knowledge of the hazard and 
not to recognition of the method of abatement.74 
American Smelting & Refining Co. v. OSHRC75 concerned the 
BY 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). 
70 Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1 OSHC 1263, 1973-74 OSHD ~ 16,345 (1973). SEE S. REP. 
NO. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 9,10 (1970). 
71 See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 1974). 
" See, e.g., Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 3 OSHC 1928, 1975-76 OSHD ~ 20,353 (1976), 
remanded 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1977) (employee crushed by falling bricks); Richmond 
Block, Inc., 1 OSHC 1505, 1973-74 OSHD ~ 17,137 (1974) (employee killed while cleaning 
inside of cement mixer); Southern Soya Corp., 1 OSHC 1412, 1973-74 OSHD ~ 16,957 (1973) 
(employees suffocated by cave-in of stored cottonseed). 
7:1 Beaird-Poulan, 7 OSHC 1225, 1979 OSHD ~ 23,493 (1979). 
74 General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 464 (1st Cir. 1979). 
" 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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issue of whether recognized hazards are limited to those detecta-
ble through the senses or whether they extend to hazards only 
detectable through instrumentation. The Eighth Circuit reviewed 
the legislative history of Section 5(a)(1) and found compelling the 
fact that Congress changed the wording from "readily apparent 
hazards," used in an earlier version of the bill, to "recognized 
hazards." Moreover, the court pointed out that the ameliorative 
purpose of the Act would be subverted by a narrow construction 
of "recognized hazards." "[TJo limit the general duty clause to 
dangers only detectable by the human senses seems to us to be a 
folly .... Where hazards are recognized but not detectable by the 
senses, common sense and prudence demand that instrumenta-
tion be utilized."76 
A hazard is considered recognized if it is common knowledge in 
the employer's industry or if the employer had knowledge of the 
hazardous condition. Thus, recognition may be established either 
objectively or subjectively. 
In National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC,77 the D.C. 
Circuit held that whether a hazard is recognized by an fndustry is 
determined by the "common knowledge of safety experts who are 
familiar with the circumstances of the industry or the activity in 
question."78 The Commission has followed National Realty 79 and 
also has held that the expert testimony of a compliance officer 
about industry practice may be used to show that a hazard was 
recognized.80 
In addition to expert testimony, the Commission and courts 
have held that other sources may be used to prove industry 
recognition. State81 and local8:! laws, American National Stan-
dards Institute (ANSI)83 and National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA)84 standards, industry publications,85 and manufacturers' 
76 Id. at 511. 
77 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
78 Id. at 1265 n.32. 
79 Beaird-Poulan, 7 OSHC 1225, 1979 OSHD ~ 23,493 (1979). 
80 Cormier Well Service, 4 OSHC 1085, 1975-76 OSHD ~ 20,583 (1976). 
81 Ford Motor Co., 5 OSHC 1765, 1977-78 OSHD ~ 22,106 (1977); Sugar Cane Growers 
Coop., 4 OSHC 1320, 1976-77 OSHD ~ 20,795 (1976); M.A. Swatek & Co., 1 OSHC 1191, 
1971-73 OSHD ~ 15,672 (1973). 
82 Williams Enterprises, Inc., 4 OSHC 1663, 1976-77 OSHD ~ 21,071 (1976). 
83 St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 n.8 (8th Cir. 1981); Betten 
Processing Corp., 2 OSHC 1724, 1974-75 OSHD ~ 19,481 (1975). 
84 Cargill, Inc., 10 OSHC 1398, 1982 OSHD ~ 25,935 (1982). 
85 R. L. Sanders Roofing Co., 7 OSHC 1566, 1979 OSHD ~ 23,756 (1979), rev'd, 620 F.2d 97 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
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warnings,86 all have been used to demonstrate that a hazard was 
recognized by the employer's industry. In proving industry rec-
ognition, it is essential that the referenced industry is the appro-
priate one.87 All industries do not necessarily recognize the same 
hazards and a citation may be vacated on this basis.88 
The second way in which a hazard may be recognized is if the 
employer has knowledge of the hazard. In Brennan v. OSHRC 
(Vy Laetos Laboratories, Inc.),89 the Eighth Circuit held that an 
employer's personal knowledge of the existence of a hazard was 
sufficient to make the hazard "recognized." This view has been 
followed by the Commission.90 It should be emphasized, however, 
that employer knowledge to show hazard recognition under Sec-
tion 5(a)(l) refers to knowledge that a condition is hazardous, not 
knowledge that a condition exists. 
An employer's knowledge that a condition is hazardous does not 
depend on the occurrence of prior accidents.91 Moreover, employer 
knowledge encompasses both actual and constructive knowledge. 
Thus, employer knowledge has been found on the basis of corre-
spondence, industry meetings, and publicized accidents;92 warn-
ings given to supervisors by an independent engineering firm and 
at least one of its own employees;93 the employer's use of fences, 
warning lights, and requiring passes to the area;94 and the em-
ployer's taking some measures to protect exposed employees.95 
Some recent decisons of the Commission96 and courts of ap-
peals97 have inferred employer knowledge from the obvious na-
ture of the hazard. For example, in one case98 the Commission 
8" Young Sales Corp., 7 OSHC 1297, 1979 OSHD ~ 23,768 (1979), aff'd 
memo No. 79-1612 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
87 See R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 620 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1980) (Commission 
erred in looking to construction industry rather than roofing industry.) 
88 See, e.g., H-30, Inc. v. Marshall, 597 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1979). 
89 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974). 
90 See, e.g., General Electric Co., 10 OSHC 2034, 1982 OSHD ~ 26,259 (1982). 
91 St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981). Cf Magma 
Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1979) (where recognition is based on 
employer knowledge the Secretary has the burden of demonstrating that the employer's 
safety precautions were unacceptable in its industry). 
9' Atlantic Sugar Ass'n, 4 OSHC 1355, 1976-77 OSHD ~ 20,821 (1976). 
93 St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981). 
94 General Electric Co., 10 OSHC 2034, 1982 OSHD ~ 26,259 (1982). 
95 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 10 OSHC 1242, 1981 OSHD ~ 25,801 (1981). 
96 Litton Systems, Inc., 10 OSHC 1179, 1981 OSHD ~ 25,817 (1981). 
97 489 F.2d at 1265, 1267. 
98 Continental Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 
(1981); Donovan v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 674 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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found an "obvious" hazard where the employer refueled gasoline 
powered trucks indoors in the vicinity of open-flame heaters. 
In National Realty the D.C. Circuit outlined the Secretary of 
Labor's burden of proving a Section 5(a)(1) violation. The Secre-
tary must prove (1) that the employer failed to render its work-
place free of a hazard which was (2) recognized and (3) causing or 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and (4) that the 
citation has specified the particular steps the cited employer 
should have taken to avoid citation and that these measures are 
feasible and have a likely utility.99 
2. Applicability to Reproductive Hazards 
There are two possible ways in which Section 5(aX1) may be 
relevant to reproductive hazards in the workplace. First, employ-
ers could be issued citations under Section 5(a)(1) and ordered to 
abate working conditions which are harmful to the reproductive 
health of workers or their offspring. The Secretary of Labor, 
however, would have two difficult hurdles to overcome in proving 
such a violation. To begin with, citation under Section 5(a)(1) 
requires the hazard to be recognized by the employer or its indus-
try. For newly discovered or newly documented reproductive 
hazards, it may be difficult to prove that they were recognized. 
Thus, Section 5(a)(1) is unlikely to be a substitute for an emer-
gency temporary standard under Section 6(c) or as an interim 
measure until Section 6(b) rulemaking is completed. 
The other problem with using Section 5(a)(1) to cite employers 
for hazardous conditions is that Section 5(a)(1) can only be used if 
there is no applicable standard under Section 5(a)(2). For example, 
if a standard had a PEL of ten ppm and the data showed that 
there were still reproductive hazards at exposures below the 
PEL, Section 5(a)(1) could not be used. The Commission has held, 
in Daniel International, Inc.,lOo that citation under Section 5(a)(1) 
is improper where the applicable standard is inadequate, because 
this would amount to a circumvention of the rulemaking process. 
OSHA's enforcement guidelines lO1 also provide that Section 
5(a)(1) may not be used to require an abatement method not set 
forth in a specific standard. For example, if a standard provides 
99 Eddy's Bakeries Co., 9 OSHC 2147, 1981 OSHD ~ 25,604 (1981). 
100 Daniel Int'l, Inc., 10 OSHC 1557, 1982 OSHD ~ 26,033 (1982). 
101 OSHA Instruction CPL 2.50 (1982). 
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for engineering controls but not medical surveillance, Section 
5(a)(1) may not be cited to require medical surveillance. 
The second possible use of Section 5(a)(1), to prohibit exclu-
sionary employment practices, has already been attempted. In 
American Cyanamid Co.,IO~ the Commission was faced with the 
question of whether the employer's policy, which excluded from 
certain employment women aged sixteen to fifty who had not 
been surgically sterilized, constituted a "hazard" under Section 
5(a)(1). Five women employed in the lead pigments department 
submitted to surgical sterilization in order to retain their posi-
tions. A majority of the Commission held that "Congress did not 
intend the act to apply to every conceivable aspect of employer-
employee relations and that due to its unique characteristics this 
condition of employment is not a hazard within the meaning of 
the general duty clause." "Hazard" was defined to mean pro-
cesses and materials which cause injury and disease by operating 
directly upon employees as they engage in work or work-related 
activities. 
Dissenting in American Cyanamid Co., Commissioner Cottine 
charged that the sterilizations resulted from a condition of em-
ployment imposed by the employer, and therefore should be con-
sidered a hazard subject to the general duty clause. Moreover, he 
cautioned that "[t]he exclusion of fertile women from certain 
employment invites employers to exclude other highly susceptible 
groups from employment when the effect varies among the ex-
posed classes of individuals." The Commission's decision was 
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.103 
Even if an employer's reproductive hazards policy were held to 
be within the purview of Section 5(a)(1), it is not clear that a 
violation could be found. As discussed earlier, citation under Sec-
tion 5(a)(1) is inappropriate if a specific standard applies. An ar-
gument could be made that the "hazard" in American Cyanamid 
is not the employer's policy, but the exposure to lead. The employ-
er's policy is simply the employer's attempt to deal with the 
hazard. Therefore, citation under Section 5(a)(1) is arguably pre-
cluded because of the existence of a standard dealing with lead. 
Another question is whether the Secretary would be able to 
prove all the necessary elements of a general duty clause viola-
\02 9 OSHC 1596, 1981 OSHD ~ 25,338 (1981), aff'd, 741 F.2d 444 
(D.C. Cir. 1984). 
\03 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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tion. Specifically, the Secretary must specify the particular steps 
the cited employer should have taken to avoid citation and to 
demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures. 
Simply ordering the return of the women to the toxic environ-
ment will not correct the problem of reproductive hazards. Fi-
nally, an order directing the company to end its exclusionary 
policies would be prospective only and would not help the women 
who were already excluded or who had undergone sterilization. 
III. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RESEARCH 
This section discusses the methods by which research on occu-
pational safety and health hazards are conducted and the way 
that OSHA develops its priorities for promulgating new stan-
dards. 
A. NIOSH and OSHA 
Much of OSHA's inactivity in regulating reproductive hazards 
in the workplace can be traced to a lack of research, both by the 
scientific community generally and by OSHA and the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Dr. Peter 
F. Infante, Director of OSHA's Office of Standards Review, has 
observed that regulation of reproductive hazards is made more 
difficult because there are relatively fewer studies on reproduc-
tive effects of substances found in the occupational setting than 
there are on other effects, such as carcinogenicity. "We're no 
better off today in terms of studying reproductive hazards than 
we were in the 1950's. However, in terms of regulating hazards, 
we're worse off because we've done little or nothing to contain 
substances shown to be teratogenic to humans exposed in the 
occupational setting."104 
Section 22 of the Act105 established NIOSH within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to be the "research arm" of 
OSHA. Thus, NIOSH research is the logical starting point in 
studying the regulatory process for reproductive hazards. 
According to Dr. William Halperin/oo Chief of NIOSH's Indus-
trywide Studies Branch, NIOSH priorities for research are usu-
ally based on clusters of disease, toxicological studies, and public 
104 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
105 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
106 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
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concern. In terms of reproductive hazards, former NIOSH Direc-
tor Dr. John F. Finkle a 107 stated that NIOSH, Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have 
been too slow in recognizing the issue of reproductive hazards. 
Current NIOSH Director Dr. J. Donald Millar lOH agrees that 
NIOSH has not paid adequate attention to reproductive hazards 
in the past and notes that there is a large gap in the scientific 
evidence needed for good regulation of hazardous substances. 
Several administrative and technical problems have hampered 
NIOSH's efforts. Dr. Philip Landrigan,l09 former Director of 
NIOSH's Division of Surveillance, Hazards Evaluation, and Field 
Studies, commented that prior attempts to study reproductive 
hazards suffered from budgetary and personnel problems. Dr. 
Jennifer Ratcliffe,1l0 Epidemiologist in NIOSH's Industrywide 
Studies Branch, remarked that NIOSH's small amount of re-
search done on reproductive hazards is related mostly to under-
staffing and that more funding and a continuity of personnel are 
needed. 
Technical problems also have interfered with NIOSH's work. 
Dr. Millar and Dr. Halperin pointed to generally weak meth-
odologies in the reproductive hazards area. Identifying suitable 
cohorts and the problem of multiple exposures are just two of 
these technical problems. Dr. Ratcliffe added that studying the 
reproductive effects on women is even harder because of the 
difficulty in obtaining a good control group. 
Table 3 indicates the status of NIOSH's current research on 
reproductive hazards. Several of the NIOSH criteria documents 
submitted to OSHA have identified reproductive hazards appro-
priate for regulatory action. These hazards include antimony,111 
carbon disulfide,112 ethylene thiourea,113 polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCB's),1!4 and nitrous oxideY5 Formaldehyde116 and EDB,117 the 
107 Interview (July 6, 1984). 
108 Interview (July 10, 1984). See generally NIOSH,Program Plan by Program Areas for 
Fiscal 1984-89 (No. 84-107) (1984). 
109 Interview (July 10, 1984). 
110 Interview (July 26, 1984). 
111 NIOSH No. 78-216. 
"" NIOSH No. 78-166. 
113 NIOSH No. 77-140. 
114 NIOSH No. 77-156. 
115 NIOSH No. 78-144. 
116 NIOSH No. 77-225. 
117 NIOSH No. 76-149. 
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TABLE 3. 
NIOSH Reproductive Hazards Research 
Suspected hazard 
1. oryzalin 
2. carbon disulfide 
3. organic compounds 
(waste water treatment 
workers) 
4. PCB's 
5. heavy metals 
(uranium workers) 
6. DBCP 
7. pharmaceutical estrogen 
8. pharmaceutical lab 
workers 
9. EDB (2 studies) 
10. lead 
11. chemotherapeutic drugs 
12. glycol ethers 
13. VDT's 
14. dioxin 
15. ethylene oxide 
16. organo-tin compounds 
17. butadiene 
18. radiofrequency 
Workers studied 
males 
males and male 
workers' wives 
males 
females 
male workers' 
wives 
males 
males 
females 
males 
males 
females 
males 
females 
males 
males and females 
males 
males 
females 
Status of research 
(as of 811184) 
completed 
completed 
completed 
completed 
completed 
completed 
completed 
completed 
1 completed! 
1 in progress 
nearly completed 
1 study completed! 
hazard alert in 
preparation 
field work completed, 
analysis in progress 
in progress 
development stage 
proposed 
interested in 
interested in 
abandoned (problem 
with cohorts) 
but being reactivated 
Note: This list excludes some reports of health hazard evaluations based on clusters 
of negative reproductive outcomes (e.g., spontaneous abortions). 
subjects of recent citizen petitions/is also have been linked with 
reproductive harms. 
The most common criticism of current OSHA-NIOSH relations 
involves the lack of technical personnel at OSHA resulting from 
personnel reductions. Dr. R. Leonard Vance, OSHA Director of 
Health Standards Development, 119 has stated that because of a 
"" For a further discussion of citizen petitions, see text and notes at notes 134-40. 
"9 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
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lack of technical personnel, OSHA is unable to review NIOSH's 
work in the depth that OSHA would like. The Directorate of 
Health Standards Programs has only one toxicologist, two 
epidemiologists, and no physicians, although the Directorate of 
Technical Support has additional personnel.120 
Dr. Eula Bingham, former Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
OSHA, agrees that the biggest problem now is OSHA's lack of 
expertise. According to Dr. Millar, OSHA needs an independent 
technical expertise. He was unaware of a shortage of professional 
staff in OSHA's Directory of Health Standards Development. Dr. 
Philip Landrigan concluded that current OSHA-NIOSH relations 
are "close to non-existent at the working level." He based this on a 
shortage of professional staff at OSHAP Dr. William Halperin, 
Chief of NIOSH's Industrywide Studies Branch, agreed that the 
staff at OSHA is "too small for the job at hand.m22 
Dr. Ralph E. Yodaiken, Director of OSHA's Office of Occupa-
tional Medicine, disagreed with the notion that the chronic per-
sonnel shortages impair OSHA's ability to perform technical re-
views.123 Although he is the only full-time occupational physician 
at OSHA, he notes that he is aided by in-house physicians on 
interagency assignments and by four residents who serve two to 
four month residencies at OSHA. In addition, he has ready access 
to the opinions of expert consultants when needed. Gary Strobel, 
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, 
acknowledged that NIOSH generates more technical material 
than OSHA can handle, but he doubts that more technical staff is 
the answer. In his view, this would require more lawyers, more 
administrators, and more staff "all the way up the line."124 
Both NIOSH and OSHA officials indicated disapproval of the 
priorities and policies of the other agency. On the NIOSH side, Dr. 
Finklea said it was difficult to get feedback from OSHA on the list 
120 According to Joanne Linhard, Administrative Officer of OSHA's Directory of 
Health Standards, as of August 1, 1984, OSHA had 25 professionals in the Health 
Standards Directory (includes health scientists and industrial hygienists), compared to a 
high of 40 working there in March, 1981. There are presently two epidemiologists and one 
toxicologist; this compares with the 1979 high of five to six epidemiologists and one 
toxicologist. Interview (August 10, 1984). 
121 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
122 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
123 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
124 Interview (July 25, 1984). The decline in scientific and nonscientific personnel at 
OSHA between March 1979 and October 1983 is documented in a recent report of the 
General Accounting Office. 14 Occup. Safety & Health Rep. (BNA) 281 (1984). 
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of NIOSH-proposed criteria documents so that NIOSH could bet-
ter set its priorities for research. Dr. Robbins commented that 
NIOSH staff sometimes became frustrated by OSHA's failure to 
implement NIOSH's scientific recommendations. Dr. Millar 
stated that OSHA needs to reinstitute a policy of specifying its 
scientific needs. 
On the OSHA side, Dr. Yodaiken and Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor for OSHA Patrick R. Tyson1:l5 explained that some-
times NIOSH research does not fit in with OSHA's regulatory 
goals. Former Solicitor of Labor Carin A. Claus126 and former 
Associate Solicitor of Labor for OSHA Benjamin W. Mintz127 
added that in some instances O~HA questioned the quality of 
NIOSH's work. 
The general framework for OSHA-NIOSH cooperative pro-
grams is set out in a 1979 interagency agreementPS In broad 
terms the agreement sets out the responsibilities of each agency 
in development of health and safety criteria, development and 
revision of health and safety standards, health hazard evalua-
tions and interactions with compliance, compliance assistance, 
technical information exchange, and other matters. Dr. Landri-
gan stated that the agreement provides a good framework, but as 
Dr. Robbins and Dr. Millar observed, it has not been followed. 
None ofthe current OSHA officials interviewed had ever heard of 
the agreement. 
B. Standards Advisory Committees 
Section 7(a) of the Actl29 established a National Advisory Com-
mittee on Occupational Safety and Health (NACOSH) to advise 
the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of HHS on matters related 
to the Act. NACOSH is a permanent committee comprised of 
twelve members, four appointed by the Secretary of HHS and 
eight appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The membership is 
comprised of representatives of management, labor, the public, 
and the occupational safety and health professions. NACOSH's 
basic purpose is to study all relevant material, consider possible 
alternatives, and weigh the feasibility of proposed standards. 
I"' Interview, July 25, 1984. 
'"<; Interview, July 1, 1984. 
m Interview, July 12, 1984. 
'"" 44 Fed. Reg. 22,834 (1979). 
I"" 29 U.S.C. § 656(a) (1976). 
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In accordance with Section 7(b),t30 the Secretary may use advi-
sory subcommittees in developing safety and health standards.l3l 
An advisory subcommittee may be either standing or ad hoc. For 
example, the Construction Standards Committee is a standing 
committee that will stay in operation for years in order to address 
the many standards needed for that industry. On the other hand, 
the Asbestos Study Committee is an ad hoc committee created to 
tackle a single problem. A typical subcommittee has fifteen mem-
bers and is composed of an equal number of employer and em-
ployee representatives, representatives of state agencies, profes-
sional representatives, one member appointed by the Secretary of 
HHS, and a federal agency representative if that agency is in-
terested in the standard. 
The legislative history and case law have recognized four pur-
poses for advisory committee consultation: (1) to enable Labor 
Department officials to take advantage of the expertise of com-
mittee members; (2) to allow affected persons to participate in the 
promulgation of standards; (3) to enable affected persons to abide 
by the standards once promulgated; and (4) to facilitate better 
informed public comments on proposed standards.l32 
Between 1971 and 1976, most of the major health standards 
proposals, such as asbestos and coke oven emissions, were based 
on advisory committee recommendations. Since 1977, advisory 
committees have not been used to make recommendations. This 
change was based on detailed requirements for advisory commit-
tees mandated by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
the Carter administration's effort to reduce the number of advi-
sory committees. Instead, OSHA has used consultants to assist in 
the research and drafting of various parts of OSHA standards.l33 
Some present and former OSHA officials have differing views 
on the efficacy of advisory panels. Dr. Vance recommended 
amending the advisory panel language in the Act in order to 
replace the members representing various factions with indepen-
dent and disinterested individuals. In his view, a panel of inde-
pendent scientists could provide the peer review of technical 
documents needed by the agency. Dr. Corn conceded that NA-
COSH has been "under-used and too political," but he still believes 
130 Id. § 656(b). 
131 The Secretary's regulations on the composition and duties of § 7(b) advisory com-
mittees appear at 29 C.F.R. Part 1912 (1984). 
132 National Constructors Ass'n v. Marshall, 581 F.2d 960, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
133 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 65. 
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that it could perform the peer review function if it was seriously 
regarded by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA. Dr. 
Bingham recognized the importance of advisory committees. In 
her view, the committees need not be non-political, and indeed 
benefit by having industry and employee representatives. 
C. Citizen Petitions 
Section 6(b)(1) of the Act contemplates that information about 
the need for a new standard may be presented by "an interested 
person, a representative of any organization of employers or em-
ployees, a nationally recognized standards-producing organiza-
tion, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, or a State or politi-
cal subdivision .... " The Secretary's regulations add that "any 
interested person may file ... a written petition for the promulga-
tion, modification, or revocation of a standard."134 
Table 4 lists the citizen petitions for new standards and the status 
of the standards. The asbestos, vinyl chloride, diving, DBep, and 
acrylonitrile standards were the only petitions granted by OSHA. 
For the other standards, OSHA's refusal to issue an ETS or begin 
rulemaking on a permanent standard was sometimes followed by 
a court proceeding in which the petitioners sought to compel 
issuance of the standard. In some instances, such as pesticides, 
cotton dust, and labeling, the mere filing of the lawsuit may have 
been a substantial factor in issuing the standard more quickly.l35 
In other instances, protracted litigation was necessary and had a 
mixed record of success for the petitioners. After nine years of 
litigation, the field sanitation case was settled in 1982 and OSHA 
agreed to consider issuing a standard. A proposed standard was 
issued in March, 1984, but in April, 1985, OSHA made a final 
determination not to issue the standard.l36 It is not clear when a 
final standard will be promulgated. 
Regardless of the merits of a citizen petition, the courts are 
extremely reluctant to order the issuance of a standard, particu-
larly an ETS. The decision to issue a standard commits the 
agency to a substantial expenditure of resources and is often at 
134 29 C.F.R. § 1911.3 (1984). 
135 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 197. 
136 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086 (1985). 
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TABLE 4. 
Citizen Petitions for OSHA Standards 
Standard Year Petitioner Status 
asbestos (I) 1971 AFL-CIO ETS issued, not 
challenged; permanent 
standard upheld 
field sanitation 1972 National Congress Proposed 
of Hispanic standard 
American Citizens withdrawn, 1984 
organophosphorous 1972 Migrant Legal Petition denied, but 
pesticides Action Program, Inc. ETS later issued. 
(subsequently vacated) 
vinyl chloride 1974 AFL-CIO ETS not challenged; 
permanent standard 
upheld 
cotton dust 1975 Textile Workers Union Petition denied, 
but permanent 
standard later issued 
hyperbaric diving 1976 United Brotherhood of ETS struck down; 
Carpenters part of permanent 
standard struck down 
labeling 1976 Public Citizen Petition denied, 
Health Research Group but proposed standard 
later issued and, 
after revision, 
final standard issued 
DBCP 1977 Oil, Chemical, and ETS not challenged; 
Atomic Workers Union permanent standard 
not challenged 
acrylonitrile 1977 United Rubber Workers ETS upheld; permanent 
standard not challenged 
the expense of other, arguably more important, rulemaking. 
Thus, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchterp7 the 
D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in ordering OSHA to 
issue an ETS for ethylene oxide. While ruling that the district 
court "impermissibly substituted its evaluation for that of 
OSHA"l38 in ordering the issuance of an ETS within twenty days, 
the court ordered OSHA to expedite its rulemaking. In UAW v. 
Donovan/~ the district court, in refusing to order OSHA to issue 
an ETS on formaldehyde, stated: "Judicial review of an OSHA 
decision not to regulate is 'extremely narrow.' Reversal of OSHA's 
137 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
138 ld. at 1153. 
139 590 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1984). 
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decision here thus requires the exceptional to exist from both 
'substantive' and 'judicial review' perspectives."l40 
D. OSHA Priorities 
Section 6(b)(1) of the Act directs the Secretary of Labor to 
promulgate standards "to serve the objectives of this Act .... " 
Section 6(g) sets forth two criteria for standards development: the 
urgency of the need for the standard ("worst-first") and the rec-
ommendations from NIOSH. 
In National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Mar-
shall,141 the D.C. Circuit reviewed OSHA's priorities for develop-
ment of health and safety standards. For health standards, 
OSHA considers the number of workers exposed, the severity of 
the hazards, the existence of research relevant to hazard iden-
tification and methods of control, NIOSH recommendations, citi-
zen petitions, court decisions, and other factors.l42 Using these 
criteria, OSHA generally has given its highest priority to car-
cinogenic su bstances.l43 
Although White House priorities and congressional oversight 
and appropriations activity also affect standards promulgation,l44 
Congress has never spelled out its priorities for OSHA standards. 
According to Dr. Vance, "the federal agencies are not doing a 
competent job of regulating chemicals and part of the blame rests 
with Congress."l45 In his view, there is a need for congressional 
guidelines in developing criteria for priorities for regulation, such 
as the nature of the hazard and the level of exposure.l46 
OSHA has developed an internal document, RUL.1, which pro-
vides a framework for dealing with severity, exposure, risk, feasi-
bility, and similar issues. According to Mr. Tyson, the potency of 
the substance and the current exposure levels are two key factors 
in establishing the need to regulate a hazardous substance.147 
Professor Claus asserted that although priority should be given to 
140 [d. at 751. 
141 626 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
142 [d. at 886. 
143 "The priority treatment for cotton dust and lead was based on the severe hazards 
involved, the large number of employees at risk, and the excellent studies available on 
the hazards of cotton dust and lead." B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 84 (footnote omitted). 
144 [d. at 85. 
145 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
146 [d. 
147 Interview (July 25, 1984). 
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the gravest health hazards, OSHA cannot afford to use all of its 
resources here. l48 Dr. Vance observed that OSHA is required by 
law to apportion its resources between reviewing old standards 
and developing new ones.149 
The difficult scientific and policy questions of deciding what 
substances should be regulated, in what order, and in what man-
ner are further complicated by political considerations. Most ob. 
servers probably would agree with Dr. Vance that "the setting of 
OSHA's priorities is, and always has been, highly politicized."lOO 
Dr. Corn commented that the priorities for standards-setting 
often depend on "who is making the most noise politically."l51 In 
his view, this has been especially true during the Carter and 
Reagan administrations.152 Mr. Auchter and Mr. Tyson contend 
that most of the pressure comes from the various interest groups 
rather than from the White House.l53 Indeed, the degree of politi-
cal pressure may be related to the type of regulation at issue. Mr. 
Auchter related that people are more reasonable in the safety 
area than in health: "Health issues involve politics at its low-
est." 154 
The way in which political considerations enter the decision-
making process is also the cause of some concern. Dr. Infante 
cautions that political influences should be used only in policy 
decisions, not in the interpretation of scientific data: "If you don't 
want to regulate because of cost, say so. Don't prostitute the 
science."l55 
IV. REGULATORY OPTIONS AND OBSTACLES 
The following section discusses the problems in promulgating 
new health standards and, in particular, standards dealing with 
reproductive hazards. These difficulties can often be traced to the 
detailed procedural requirements of the Act, judicial interpreta-
tions of OSHA rulemaking, administrative and political factors, 
and scientific uncertainty. 
148 Interview (July 1, 1984). 
149 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
150 Id. 
151 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
152 Id. 
153 Telephone interview (July 30, 1984); Interview (July 25, 1984). 
154 Telephone interview (July 30, 1984). 
155 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
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A. Procedures for Promulgating Standards 
1. Overview 
Section 6(b) provides that any promulgation, modification, or 
revocation of OSHA standards must comply with specific 
rulemaking procedures.156 Pursuant to Section 6(b)(2), the Secre-
tary is required to publish a notice of proposed rule making in the 
Federal Register and must allow thirty days after publication for 
interested parties to submit written data or comments. As a 
practical matter, OSHA usually allows at least ninety days for the 
submission of data or comments.157 
OSHA usually schedules a public hearing when a proposal is 
issued, even though under Section 6(b)(3) a hearing is not required 
unless requested. Persons wishing to testify must indicate to 
OSHA the amount of time requested and the specific provisions to 
be addressed. Most of the testimony time is used to question 
witnesses.15s OSHA also has its own witnesses and questions 
them.159 
OSHA's regulations provide that rule making proceedings shall 
be legislative in nature, but that fairness may require cross-
examination on "crucial issues.m60 In practice, however, OSHA 
has usually permitted cross-examination quite freely. The parties 
are often joined together (e.g., all employers, all unions) for the 
purpose of having a single individual question or cross-examine 
the witnesses.161 
Hearings on proposed standards are of increasing importance, 
both in allowing interested persons an opportunity to present 
their views and in developing the record for subsequent judicial 
review. This may account for the growing length of the hearing. 
For example, OSHA's first asbestos rulemaking hearing took four 
days and resulted in a record of 1100 pages. The hearing on 
OSHA's carcinogens policy took two months and had a record of 
250,000 pages.162 
Mter the hearing is completed, the presiding ALI usually gives 
156 OSHA rulemaking procedures appear at 29 C.F.R. Part 1911 (1984). 
157 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 63. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 64. 
160 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15 (1984). 
161 B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 65. 
162 Id. at 62. 
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the parties thirty days to submit additional data and thirty days 
after that to submit post-hearing briefs.l63 According to Section 
6(b)(4), the final standard (or a determination that no new stan-
dard is needed) must be issued within sixty days after the end of 
the comment period. For a variety of reasons, OSHA has not been 
able to meet this deadline. 
Courts have held that no mandatory timetable exists for prom-
ulgation of final standards under Section 6(b)(4). For example, in 
National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Usery,164 the 
plaintiff sought an order requiring the Secretary to promulgate 
field sanitation, machinery guarding, and other agricultural 
standards. The district court granted summary judgment for the 
plaintiff and held that the timetable for promulgating standards 
in Section 6(b)(1) through (4) was mandatory. On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed. In an opinion by Justice Clark, the court held 
that the timetable was not mandatory because: (1) the Secretary 
was given discretion under Section 6(g) to "alter priorities and 
defer action due to legitimate statutory considerations;" and (2) 
inasmuch as the Secretary can decide not to issue a standard, 
"there is no sense in proceeding completely through the rulemak-
ing process ... only to end up with the Secretary issuing a notice 
that the standard is not adopted."165 
The final form of a standard may differ from the original pro-
posal. Changes in a standard often reflect the comments and 
criticisms of interested parties as well as further agency delibera-
tion and thus are to be encouraged. Nevertheless, the argument 
has been raised that where the final standard differs from the 
proposal, interested persons have been denied an opportunity to 
comment on the standard in its final form. 
In Borg-Warner COrp./66 the Commission held that an asbestos 
16" I d. at 65. 
164 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'g, 425 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1975). 
16.; [d. at 1200. On remand, the district court ordered the Secretary to complete devel-
opment of a field sanitation standard as soon as possible and to submit a timetable for 
completion of the standard to the court within 30 days. National Congress of Hispanic 
Am. Citizens v. Marshall, No. 2142-73 (D.D.C. 1978), 6 OSHC 2157, 1979 OSHD ~ 23,244 
(1978). The D.C. Circuit again reversed. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. 
Marshall, 626 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court reiterated that the timetable in §§ 
6(b)(1)-(4) is not mandatory. "The Secretary may delay development of a standard beyond 
that statutory timetables when, in good faith, he determines that other priorities de-
mand an adjustment." [d. at 891. Nevertheless, when a delay is necessary, the Secretary 
must provide a good faith representation as to when the standard will be forthcoming. 
IRR 6 OSHC 1393, 1978 OSHD ~ 22,555 (1978). 
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standard was not rendered invalid merely because it differed 
from the proposed standard. The notice of proposed rule making 
set forth the text of an emergency temporary standard (ETS) and 
announced the intent to adopt the ETS as a final standard, with 
or without changes after interested persons had an opportunity 
to comment on the proposal. Similarly, in Taylor Diving & Salvage 
Co. v. United States Department of Labor/67 the Fifth Circuit 
rejected a challenge to the employee-access-to-records provision 
~ of the commercial diving standard. According to the court, it is not 
necessary for the final form of a regulation to be republished in 
the Federal Register where the proposed regulation, in its initial 
form, gives sufficient notice to the interested parties of the Secre-
tary's intentions. 
Final OSHA standards typically contain detailed preambles, 
the standard itself, and any appendices. A common format is as 
follows: 
1. An introductory discussion of the substance being regulated, 
its uses, and toxic properties. 
2. A description of the background and history of the rulemak-
ing proceeding. 
3. A summary of the record and a discussion of the major issues 
raised by the proceeding. For health standards, this includes the 
extent of the risk upon exposure to the SUbstance, the PEL, and 
economic and technological feasibility. 
4. A discussion of the specific provisions of the standard, 
section-by-section, including an explanation why the particular 
provision was adopted and others were rejected. 
5. A statement, as appropriate, on OSHA compliance with pres-
idential executive orders on regulatory analysis,168 the National 
Environmental Policy Act,UJ9 and the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act. 170 
6. The text of the standard.17l 
2. Possible Modifications 
There is widespread agreement that the OSHA rule making 
process is slow, cumbersome, a drain on resources, and extremely 
1"7 599 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1979). Accord, Daniel Int'l Corp. v. OSHRC, 656 F.2d 925 
(4th Cir. 1981). 
168 Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). See M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 71 (2d ed. 1983). 
169 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. v 1981); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1999.1 to .8 (1984). See M. 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 168, at 70-71. 
170 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982). 
171 See, B. MINTZ, supra note 30, at 71. 
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adversarial. 172 In an effort to expedite the process, in 1975 former 
Secretary of Labor John Dunlop attempted to use negotiations 
between the steel companies and unions to reach a consensus on a 
standard for coke oven emissions. As one commentator notes, 
"[t]his effort failed, and Dunlop's approach was greeted with con-
siderable hostility."173 
In 1983 OSHA enlisted the services of neutral third-party 
mediators to facilitate a labor-industry agreement on revision of 
the existing benzene standard. Industry representatives from the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, Rubber Manufacturers As-
sociation, American Iron and Steel Institute, and the American 
Petroleum Institute held a series of mediation sessions with union 
representatives from the AFL-CIO, United Steelworkers, Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers, and United Rubber Workers. Al-
though mediation was unsuccessful in the benzene standard, the 
use of mediation has prompted a discussion of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques in OSHA rule making. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, Patrick R. 
Tyson/74 and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor, Gary A. Strobel/75 were optimistic about mediation and 
thought that it could shorten the rule making process (both the 
hearing and comment period) and ease the resource drain of 
standards-setting. Dr. R. Leonard Vance/76 Director of OSHA 
Health Standards Programs, also was optimistic. He thought that 
the best chance for success might be with chemicals that had not 
been the subject of prior regulation and where the positions of the 
parties had not hardened. He favored mediation to reach a draft 
standard and then allow the public to comment. He asked for 
budget support for fiscal 1985 for this activity. 
Other former OSHA officials are less sanguine about the pros-
pects for mediation. Former Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
OSHA, Dr. Morton Corn,177 and former Associate Solicitor of 
172 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
DELAYS IN SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER CAUSING AND OTHER 
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES (1977); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBUC WELFARE: SLOW PROGRESS LIKELY IN DEVElr 
OPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HARMFUL PHYSICAL AGENTS 
FOUND IN WORKPLACES (1973). 
173 B. MINTZ, supra note 29, at 88 (footnote omitted). 
174 Interview (July 25, 1984). 
175 Interview (July 25, 1984). 
176 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
177 Interview (July 3,1984). 
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Labor for OSHA, Benjamin W. Mintz,t78 were "skeptical" about 
mediation, perhaps as a result of OSHA's experience in 1975. 
Former Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, Dr. Eula Bin-
gham,l79 also expressed reservations. Dr. Bingham cautioned that 
it would be inappropriate to have the mediation take place too far 
along in the rulemaking process. Former Solicitor of Labor Carin 
A. Claus/80 while agreeing that consensus is important, ques-
tioned whether OSHA can or should delegate its statutory re-
sponsibility to protect the public interest. Specifically, she ques-
tioned whether the unions can be expected to represent the views 
of all workers, including non-union employees. Mr. Strobel coun-
tered this argument by asserting that the regular comment pe-
riod protects against this danger and permits comments by all 
concerned individuals.181 
Even those individuals who have doubts about mediation 
emphasize the need for labor-management cooperation. Dr. 
Bingham recommends that labor and mangement attempt to 
reach agreement on key issues.182 Professor Mintz notes that joint 
statements, stipulations of fact, and other agreements help the 
rulemaking process, but he adds that such agreements are 
difficult to reach within the present rulemaking framework. l83 
3. Judicial review 
The validity of OSHA standards may be reviewed by the courts 
in two ways.184 First, any party adversely affected by a standard 
may obtain pre-enforcement review by filing a petition for review 
within sixty days of a standard's promulgation. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 6(f), these petitions may be filed in the United States court of 
appeals for the circuit in which the party resides or has its princi-
pal place of business. A copy of the petition must be forwarded to 
the Secretary by the clerk of the court. 
The second method of review, available to any person "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved" by a final order of the Commission, 
is filing a petition for review pursuant to Section l1(a). Petitions 
17. Interview (July 12, 1984). 
17. Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
I"" Interview (July 1, 1984). 
IHI Interview (July 25, 1984). 
1"2 Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
II!3 Interview (July 12, 1984). 
184 The discussion of judicial review is based largely upon M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
168, at 89-97. 
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for review under Section l1(a) must also be filed within sixty days 
in a United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
violation is alleged to have occurred, for the circuit in which the 
employer has its principal office, or in the District of Columbia 
Circuit. 
Filing a petition for judicial review under Section 6(f) does not 
stay the effective date of a standard, nor does a Section l1(a) 
petition stay a final order of the Commission. A reviewing court, 
however, may grant a stay. In judicial review under either section 
of· the Act, the Secretary's determinations in promulgating a 
standard are conclusive if supported by "substantial evidence" in 
the record considered as a whole. 
Section 6(f) specifically provides for judicial review of standards 
in the United States courts of appeals. Section 8(g), which au-
thorizes OSHA to promulgate necessary rules and regulations, is 
silent on the issue of judicial review. Therefore, under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the district courts are the proper 
forum for initial review of regulations. Consequently, it is impor-
tant to determine whether the Secretary has promulgated a 
"standard" or a "regulation." 
In Louisiana Chemical Association v. Bingham,l85 the Fifth 
Circuit held that although the promulgating agency's characteri-
zation of a rule is a relevant factor, it is not necessarily deter-
minative. According to the court, Congress conceived of Section 6 
OSHA standards as remedial measures addressed to specific and 
already identified hazards, not as purely administrative efforts 
designed to uncover violations of the Act and discover unknown 
dangers. Applying this test, the access to exposure and medical 
records rule is a regulation aimed primarily at possible detection 
of significant risks not yet covered by standards. Therefore, it is a 
regulation reviewable in district court rather than a standard 
reviewable in the court of appeals. 
Section 6(f) permits the party challenging the standard to 
choose to file for judicial review in the United States court of 
appeals for the circuit in which it resides or has its principle place 
of business. Considering the national scope of OSHA standards 
and the number of parties adversely affected by a standard, there 
is ample opportunity for forum shopping. Indeed, the ability of 
affected industries to obtain judicial review in a sympathetic 
court is one of the major impediments to OSHA rule making ac-
1!!5 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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cording to a number of individuals interviewed, including Dr. 
Bingham and Dr. Vance.l86 
A second, related problem concerns the "race to the cour-
thouse" that invariably occurs when two or more parties are 
seeking review in different circuits. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 
2112(a), if there are two or more filings in different courts of 
appeals to review the same administrative order, venue will lie in 
the court of the first filing. 
In Industrial Union Department v. Bingham/87 the eourt held 
that a petition to review the benzene standard was timely filed in 
the D.C. Circuit after the standard was disclosed to industry and 
labor representatives, but before the standard was filed with the 
Federal Register. Nevertheless, "in the interest of justice," the 
court ordered the case transferred to the Fifth Circuit, where "the 
first petition was filed subsequent to the disclosure of the agency 
decision to the public."I88 
After the decision in Industrial Union Department, OSHA pro-
mulgated a regulation that indicated that standards are "issued" 
when they are filed with the Federal Register.189 Although the 
regulation gave all parties the same starting time, it did not end 
the "race to the courthouse." Indeed, even with a uniform start-
ing time, problems of varying sorts have arisen. For example, in 
United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall/oo a conflict developed 
involving two challenges to OSHA's lead standard. When OSHA 
"issued" its standard on November 13, 1978, the Steelworkers 
immediately filed a petition for judicial review in the Third Circuit 
at 8:45 a.m. EST. At precisely the same time, 7:45 a.m. CST, the 
Lead Industries Association filed a petition in the Fifth Circuit. In 
ruling on the venue question, the Third Circuit refused to go 
beyond the official notations of the time of filing to determine if 
one petition had been filed seconds before the other petition. The 
court declared that "unlike race tracks, ... courts are not equip-
ped with photoelectric timers, and we decline the invitation to 
speculate which nose would show as first in a photo finish."I91 The 
IS6 Dr. Vance added that "activists" also may obtain review in a sympathetic court and 
induce the court to determine OSHA's regulatory priorities. Interview with Dr. R. 
Leonard Vance, Director of OSHA Health Standards Development (July 3, 1984). 
187 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
188 [d. at 972. 
189 42 Fed. Reg. 65,166 (1977). 
190 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979). 
191 [d. at 695. 
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court then ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the D.C. 
Circuit, which was deemed "obviously a convenient forum"192 be-
cause a petition to review an EPA lead standard had recently 
been filed by the industry in that court.193 
Section 6(f) grants the right to seek judicial review to "any 
person who may be adversely affected by a standard." There have 
been no OSHA cases decided on the issue of how adversely af-
fected a person must be in order to challenge a standard. In Fire 
Equipment Manufacturers' Association v. Marshall,194 however, 
the Seventh Circuit held that a trade association and manufac-
turers of fire protection equipment did not have standing to chal-
lenge an amendment to OSHA's fire protection standard. The 
industry petitioners claimed they were "adversely affected" be-
cause the new standard would result in a decline of profits and 
competitive disadvantage. In rejecting the argument, the court 
held that "[t]he profits of manufacturers of fire fighting equip-
ment are not within the zone-of-interests protected or regulated 
by the Act."195 
Section 6(f) provides that in judicial review of new OSHA stan-
dards "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if 
supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a 
whole."1OO Thus, although the substantial evidence test is gener-
ally used in adjudicatory proceedings or formal rulemaking it 
applies to OSHA standards promulgation, which is informal 
rulemaking.197 The Act's anomalous use of the substantial evi-
dence test resulted from a legislative compromise. The Senate bill 
provided for informal rule making, while the House version re-
quired formal rule making and the use of the substantial evidence 
test.19B 
The courts have had considerable difficulty in applying the 
substantial evidence test in reviewing OSHA standards. In Asso-
192 Id. at 698. 
193 For a further discussion of and proposed solutions to this problem, see Rothstein, 
OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND. L. REV. 71, 
87-92 (1981). 
194 679 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983). 
195 679 F.2d at 682. 
196 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). 
197 Formal rulemaking involves adjudicatory hearings, including the right to submit 
oral evidence and to conduct cross examination. Informal rulemaking involves notice 
and an opportunity to submit comments. See Note, Judicial Review under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal 
Rulemaking, 1974 DUKE L.J. 459 (1974). 
198 Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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ciated Industries v. United States Department of Labor/99 the 
Second Circuit held that the substantial evidence test must be 
applied to policy determinations as well as findings of fact. The 
court suggested, however, that the difference between the sub-
stantial evidence test and the "arbitrary and capricious" test may 
be largely semantic.2°O This view has been shared by the Fifth 
Circuit.~ol 
The D.C. Circuit has taken a somewhat different approach and 
considers that the substantial evidence test provides for "more 
rigorous scrutiny" than the arbitrary and capricious test.20'2 In 
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson/o3 the D.C. Circuit found 
it "impossible" to apply the substantial evidence test to the Secre-
tary's policy determinations. The court indicated it would analyze 
the Secretary's rule making to determine whether it had been 
performed "in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of 
arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules for 
general application in the future."~o4 
In AFlrCIO v. Marshall/o5 the D.C. Circuit set out the scope of 
its review function. 
The tasks of this reviewing court are thus to ensure that the 
agency has: (1) acted within the scope of its authority; (2) 
followed procedures required by statute and by its own regu-
lations; (3) explicated the bases for its decisions; (4) adduced 
substantial evidence in the record to support its determina-
tions.~o6 
The most detailed standard of review was formulated by the 
Third Circuit in Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers As-
199 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). 
"" [d. at 349-50. 
'0' See American Petrol. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978), affd sub nom. 
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Florida Peach 
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120,128-29 (5th Cir. 1974). See 
also Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 404 n.22 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(rejecting assertion that substantial evidence test can be used only for factual determi-
nations and noting that use of this test for policy considerations is practicable). 
'0' AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 & nA6 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. 
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
,o3 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
'04 [d. at 475 (quoting Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 
(D.C. Cir. 1968». See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
'05 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd suI; nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. 
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
'06 617 F.2d at 650 (footnotes omitted). 
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sociation v. Brennan.207 According to the court, judicial review of 
any standard promulgated under Section 6 is a five-step process, 
consisting of the following: 
(1) determining whether the Secretary's notice of proposed 
rule making adequately informed interested persons of the action 
taken; 
(2) determining whether the Secretary's promulgation ade-
quately sets forth reasons for his action; 
(3) determining whether the statement of reasons reflects con-
sideration of factors relevant under the statute; 
(4) determining whether presently available alternatives were 
at least considered; and 
(5) if the Secretary's determination is based in whole or in part 
on factual matters subject to evidentiary development, whether 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the deter-
mination.208 
Despite these slightly different tests, the courts of appeals have 
been in agreement on the general standards of review of policy 
decisions. Judicial review of policy decisions will be limited to 
determining whether the Secretary's action is consistent with the 
statutory language and purpose/09 whether the policy judgment 
is reasonably related to factual matters supported by substantial 
evidence/l0 and whether there are adequate explanations of the 
assumptions underlying predictions or extrapolations and of the 
bases for resolving conflicts and ambiguities.211 A standard will be 
remanded only if there are "nagging questions" about the reason 
and rationale for the Secretary's particular choices.212 
The Supreme Court also has been troubled in its search for the 
most appropriate standard by which to review the complex scien-
tific and policy issues involved in OSHA rulemaking.213 It has 
207 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). Accord, American Iron 
& Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 83()'31 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 
(1980). 
208 503 F.2d at 1160. 
200 American Petrol. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. 
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (citing Synthetic 
Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir. 1974». 
210 Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1980). 
211 AFIrCIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. American 
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
212 American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dis-
missed, 488 U.S. 917 (1980) (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 488 
(D.C. Cir. 1974». 
213 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 695 & n.9, 705-06 
---------- ------
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indicated, however, that it will give deference to the courts of 
appeals' determinations of whether there is substantial evidence. 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,214 
the Supreme Court held that, because the Act places responsibil-
ity for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts of 
appeals, the Supreme Court will intervene only in the rare in-
stance when the substantial evidence standard was misap-
prehended or grossly misapplied by the court of appeals. 
[O]ur inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first 
instance, would find OSHA's findings supported by substan-
tial evidence. Instead, we turn to OSHA's findings and the 
record upon which they were based to decide whether the 
Court of Appeals "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" 
the substantial evidence test.21S 
4. Emergency Temporary Standards 
Section 6(c)(l) provides that if the Secretary determines that 
employees are "exposed to grave danger from exposure to sub-
stances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or 
from new hazards,,,z16 an emergency temporary standard (ETS) 
may be issued. These standards are effective immediately upon 
publication in the Federal Register without any detailed rulemak-
ing requirements. Under Section 6(c)(3) an ETS may remain in 
effect for only six months; thereafter, the Secretary must prom-
ulgate a permanent standard under Section 6(b).z17 In this event 
the ETS serves as the proposed rule.z18 
Although emergency temporary standards need not be pro-
mulgated in accordance with the detailed procedures of Section 
6(b), there are certain procedural requirements. One of these 
requirements is a statement of reasons.Z19 In Dry Color Manufac-
turers Association v. Department of Labor,'.!:2O the Secretary at-
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally, McGarity, Substantive and Procedural 
Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Car-
cinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979); Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk 
Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 
ENVTL. L. 301 (1981). 
214 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
21. Id. at 523. 
216 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(l) (1982). 
217 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1982). 
218 See 29 C.F.R. § 1911.12 (1984). 
21. 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1982). 
220 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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tempted to promulgate an ETS concerning exposure to fourteen 
chemicals said to be carcinogens. The only statement of reasons 
was a conclusion, finding the chemicals to be carcinogens and 
reciting the need for a standard based on the language of Section 
6(c)(1). The Third Circuit held that the statement of reasons was 
inadequate to satisfy Section 6(e). According to the court, an ETS 
statement of reasons must indicate: (1) what data in the record 
are being principally relied on; (2) why those data suffice to show 
that the substances covered by the standard are harmful and 
pose a grave danger of exposure to employees; and (3) why the 
particular standard is necessary for the protection of employ-
ees.~~l 
The dissent in Dry Color, however, argued that preparing an 
exhaustive statement of reasons would be time-consuming and 
render the ETS mechanism ineffective. Thus, it was suggested, all 
that should be required is notice of the Secretary's reason for 
issuing the ETS and access to the scientific data upon which the 
Secretary relied.~~~ 
In Florida Peach Growers Association v. United States Depart-
ment of Labor/~3 organizations representing farmworkers con-
tended that the Secretary exceeded his authority by summarily 
amending an ETS without using the modification procedures of 
Section 6(b). The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that an ETS 
may be amended in the same manner as it was originally issued 
under Section 6(c). The court observed that adherence to Section 
6(b) procedures could easily consume all of the six month life of 
the ETS.~~4 
The final function of an ETS may be to serve as a proposed rule 
for the issuance of a permanent standard. In Synthetic Organic 
Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Brennan/~5 the Secretary 
formed an advisory committee, after an ETS was issued, to help 
draft a permanent standard. Section 6(b), however, provides that 
a proposed rule may not be published until sixty days after the 
submission of an advisory committee's report.~~6 The Third Circuit 
", Id. at 106-07; see Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d 
Cir. 1974), cen. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n V. United States 
Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. V. United States Dep't of 
Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). 
'" 486 F.2d at 110 (dissenting opinion). 
'" 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). 
"4 I d. at 127. 
"., 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1974), cen. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
"6 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). 
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rejected the Secretary's assertion that the apparent conflict be-
tween Sections 6(b) and 6(c) should be resolved by exempting ETS 
promulgation from this procedural requirement of Section 6(b). 
The court held that the language of Section 6(b) prevails and that 
an ETS may not be used "as a technique for avoiding the pro-
cedural safeguards of public comment and hearings required by 
subsection 6(b)."~~7 Thus, the Secretary must either appoint the 
committee well in advance of issuing an ETS or promulgate a 
permanent standard based on an ETS without using an advisory 
committee. 
An emergency temporary standard must be based on the exis-
tence of a grave danger and the need for a standard to protect 
workers from the danger. The first element, therefore, is proving 
that there is a grave danger. According to the Third Circuit in 
Dry Color Manufacturers Association v. Department of Labor,228 
the Act does not require an absolute certainty of the deleterious 
effect of a substance, but there must be evidence showing "more 
than some possibility" of a grave danger.~29 The dissent, however, 
contended that the purpose of the Act would be best effectuated 
by holding that even a scintilla of evidence can support an ETS.:l3O 
In Florida Peach Growers Association v. United States Depart-
ment of Labor/31 the Fifth Circuit rejected the suggestion that 
deaths must occur before the issuance of an ETS. Nevertheless, 
the court held that there must be a danger of "incurable, perma-
nent, or fatal consequences to workers, as opposed to easily cura-
ble and fleeting effects on their health . . . . "2~ 
In many instances the only scientific research on a hazardous 
substance before promulgating an ETS will be animal studies. 
The application to humans of data extrapolated from animal 
studies of carcinogens, however, was specifically accepted by the 
Third Circuit in Dry Color and Synthetic Organic Chemical Man-
ufacturers Association v. Brennan.233 
227 506 F.2d at 389 (quoting Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 
104-05 n.9a (3d Cir. 1973». 
228 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973). 
229 [d. at 104. 
230 [d. at 110 (dissenting opinion). 
231 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). 
232 [d. at 132. 
233 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). See generally Comment, 
Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL L. 344 (1977). 
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The second element of an ETS is the need to protect workers 
from the danger. In Dry Color the court noted that the purpose of 
Section 6(c)(l), to provide immediate protection, allows the Secre-
tary to assume that employee exposure is occurring at any work-
place containing the proscribed hazardous substance and where 
the corrective measures required by the ETS are not in effect.234 If 
the workplace is as safe and healthful without compliance with 
the letter of the ETS, the employer must resort to the variance 
procedures of Section 6(d).235 
As the following table demonstrates, OSHA has had a difficult 
time in the courts of appeals in challenges to its ETS's. 
This is particularly true in the Fifth Circuit, which has refused to 
TABLE 5. 
Judicial Review of OSHA Emergency Temporary Standards 
Standard Date Result Citation 
asbestos (I) 1971 Not challenged 
organophosphorous 1973 Vacated Florida Peach Growers 
pesticides Ass'n v. United States 
Department of Labor 
489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 
1974) 
14 carcinogens 1973 12 Upheld Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n 
2 Vacated v. Department of Labor, 
486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 
1973) 
vinyl chloride 1974 Not challenged 
commercial diving 1976 Stayed Taylor Diving & Salvage 
Co. v. Department of 
Labor, 537 F.2d 819 
(5th Cir. 1976) 
benzene 1977 Stayed Industrial Union Dep't 
v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 
965 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
DBCP 1977 Not challenged 
acrylonitrile 1978 Stay refused Vistron v. OSHA, 
6 OSHC 1483 (6th 
Cir. 1978) 
asbestos (II) 1983 Stayed Asbestos Info. Ass'n 
v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415 
(5th Cir. 1984) 
234 486 F.2d at 102-03 n.3. 
235 Id. Cf. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 537 F.2d 819 
(5th Cir. 1976) (stay of ETS granted where there was probability of success on merits of 
attack on standard and the likelihood of issuance of variance too uncertain to eliminate 
possibility of irreparable injury). 
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uphold the ETS for pesticides, commercial diving, or asbestos. The 
most devastating blow to the use of emergency standards by 
OSHA was the Fifth Circuit's recent decision relating to asbestos. 
In 1983 OSHA promulgated an ETS for asbestos, lowering the 
PEL from 2.0 fibers per cubic centimeter (flcc) to 0.5 flcc. The ETS 
was based on a new quantitative risk assessment showing that 
reducing the PEL for six months would save forty to eighty lives. 
A group of asbestos products manufacturers sought judicial re-
view of the ETS in the Fifth Circuit. 
In Asbestos Information Association/North America v. OSHA,2?J3 
the Fifth Circuit held that the ETS was invalid and stayed its 
enforcement. The central theme of the court's analysis focuses on 
whether OSHA had proven the need to adopt an ETS for asbestos 
rather than modifying the existing standard after notice and 
comment rule making. The court pointed out that Section 6(b) 
rule making can be completed within one year regardless of an 
ETS and therefore "the practical effects of our decision on the 
regulations enforced in the workplace will endure only a short 
time."237 It further added that "the plain wording of the statute 
limits as to assessing the harm likely to accrue, or the grave 
danger that the ETS may alleviate, during the six-month period 
that is the life of the standard."238 
One reason for publishing the ETS, according to OSHA, was to 
set in motion the process of promulgating a new permanent as-
bestos standard. The court was wary of permitting Section 6(c) 
rule making to substitute for Section 6(b) rule making: 
[A]s its legislative history makes clear, the ETS statute is not 
to be used merely as an interim relief measure, but treated as 
an extraordinary power to be used only in "limited situa-
tions" in which grave danger exists, and then, to be "deli-
cately exercised." The Agency cannot use its ETS powers as a 
stop-gap measure. This would allow it to displace its clear 
obligations to promulgate rules after public notice and oppor-
tunity for comment in any case, not just in those in which an 
ETS is necessary to avert grave danger.239 
The court rejected the asbestos manufacturers' argument that 
an ETS may not be issued unless it is based on new information. 
A "heightened awareness" based on new extrapolations certainly 
could justify the Secretary's action.240 Nevertheless, the benefits 
236 727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984). 
237 [d. at 420. 
238 [d. at 422. 
239 [d. (citations omitted). 
240 [d. at 423. 
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of the ETS must outweigh its costS.241 While it rejected the indus-
try argument that the costs were excessive, the court was uncon-
vinced of the accuracy of OSHA's estimate of the benefits. 
OSHA performed a detailed quantitative risk assessment and 
developed a dose-response curve from epidemiological studies of 
exposed workers rather than by relying on animal data. This 
assessment was made specifically to satisfy the "significant risk" 
requirement of the Supreme Court's benzene decision242 and the 
"grave danger" language of Section 6(c). The Fifth Circuit was 
troubled by the possibility of inaccuracy in using risk assessment 
for a six-month exposure period. 
[A]lthough risk assessment analysis is an extremely useful 
tool, especially when used to project lifetime consequences of 
exposure, the results of its application to a small slice of time 
are speculative because the underlying data-base projects 
only long term risks . . . . Applying the risk assessment 
process to a period of six months, one-ninetieth of OSHA's 
estimated working lifetime, only magnifies those inherent 
uncertainties.243 
Moreover, as the court had previously noted, the mathematical 
extrapolations had not been the subject of "peer reviews." "Pre-
cisely because the data has not been scrutinized, however, the 
court has particular interest in having access to both favorable 
and unfavorable peer reviews."244 
Finally, the court held that, even assuming OSHA's projected 
benefits would accrue from the ETS, OSHA failed to prove that an 
ETS - the "most dramatic weapon in its enforcement arsenal"245 
- is necessary to achieve the projected benefits.246 Specifically, 
OSHA had failed to enforce its current standard and could reduce 
exposures through enforcement and expeditious Section 6(b) 
rulemaking.247 
The court's opinion is subject to a variety of criticisms. Simply 
stated, the court is requiring OSHA to do the impossible. If the 
ETS were not accompanied by quantitative risk assessment of the 
expected benefits, undoubtedly the court would have held the 
ETS to be invalid. OSHA, however, performed a detailed risk 
241 [d. at 423-24. 
242 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
243 727 F.2d at 425-26. 
244 [d. at 421 n.15. 
245 [d. 
246 [d. at 426. 
247 [d. at 427. 
676 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:627 
assessment based on epidemiological evidence and calculated the 
number of lives expected to be saved. Differences of opinion over 
mathematical models should not obscure the fact that under any 
model a substantial number oflives would be saved by the ETS. It 
is never possible to predict precisely the effects of exposure on 
thousands of workers - nor is such evidence required. As the 
Supreme Court stated in the benzene case: 
OSHA is not required to support its finding that a Sib'TIificant 
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty. 
Although the Agency's findings must be supported by sub-
stantial evidence, ... a reviewing court [is required] to give 
OSHA some leeway where its findings must be made on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge.248 
Furthermore, the court's discounting of numerous reputable 
studies because of a lack of opportunity for public comment is 
antithetical to the express purpose of Section 6(c). 
Not surprisingly, many present and former OSHA officials were 
dismayed by the court's decision and its implications. Former 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, Thorne G. Auchter, 
stated: "You can kiss ETS's goodbuy. They are not a viable option 
for the foreseeable future."~49 Former Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for OSHA, Dr. Eula Bingham, did not agree that emer-
gency standards are dead, citing the standard DBCP, but 
cautioned that unless there were "hot new data" it would be best 
to use an ETS only for new hazards.250 Former Solicitor of Labor, 
Carin A. Claus/51 and former Associate Solicitor of Labor for 
OSHA, Benjamin W. Mintz/5~ observed the problem of trying to 
persuade a reviewing court to uphold OSHA's use of an ETS to 
lower the PEL of a current standard. Former Assistant Secretary 
of Labor for OSHA, Dr. Morton Corn/,,3 pointed out, however, that 
even emergency standards for new hazards, such as hyperbaric 
diving, had been struck down. 
The individuals interviewed stated that the record overwhelm-
ingly supported issuance of the asbestos standard. According to 
Dr. R. Leonard Vance, Director of OSHA Health Standards De-
velopment: "If there is no grave danger for asbestos, there is no 
248 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980). 
249 Telephone interview (July 30, 1984). 
250 Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
"." Interview (July 1, 1984). 
"5" Interview (July 12, 1984). 
"53 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
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grave danger for anything. The health effects of asbestos are ten 
times worse than the rest of the substances combined."254 He 
further added that, other than tobacco smoke, there was more 
epidemiological data on asbestos than any other substance of 
which he was aware. Mr. Auchter expressed a similar view: 
"The asbestos ETS was the best piece of work the agency had 
ever done - by far."25.') 
Professor Claus reasoned that ETS challenges are difficult 
cases for the courts to decide on an emergency basis and that they 
are reluctant to order any capital expenditures when the life of 
the standard is only six months. In her view, Congress would need 
to amend Section 6(c)'s "grave danger" language to make the ETS 
provision effective.256 In the meantime, both Dr. Corn and Mr. 
Auchter agree that pursuing an ETS now would be a waste of the 
agency's limited resources in the sense of its very limited probabil-
ity of being upheld. 
5. Generic Standards 
As discussed in this section, the promulgation of new OSHA 
standards is a long, costly, and difficult process. In reviewing 
OSHA standards the courts insist on procedural regularity, a 
showing of significant risk, the use of the "best available evi-
dence," proof of material impairment, demonstration oftechnolog-
ical and economic feasibility, and substantial evidence of other 
crucial elements. These requirements, budget and personnel 
problems, legal challenges, policy shifts at OSHA, and other fac-
tors have resulted in very few new standards being promulgated. 
There have been only ten successful permanent rulemaking 
actions since 1971, resulting in 22 health standards. The bulk of 
OSHA health standards remain the outdated 1968 ACGIH TL V's 
adopted in 1971. The standards contain mostly PEL's, without 
any requirements for environmental monitoring, biological moni-
toring, or medical surveillance. While hundreds of new chemicals 
are being introduced into industry each year, only a few new 
standards are promulgated. As a result, the agency is always 
"playing catch-up." For example, in 1977 OSHA lowered the PEL 
for the pesticide DBCP when it was shown that DBCP was a 
gametotoxin and carcinogen.257 The pesticide often used as a sub-
'54 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
'50 [d. 
'56 Interview (July I, 1984). 
;0' 42 Fed. Reg. 45,536-38 (1977) 
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stitute for DBCP is ethylene dibromide (EDB), a potent carcino-
gen which also has been linked to a variety of reproductive harms. 
It is not clear when OSHA will tighten restrictions on exposure to 
EDB. 
Under the leadership of Dr. Morton Corn, OSHA attempted to 
promulgate health standards on a "generic" basis. That is, OSHA 
sought to establish a regulatory framework for rule making on an 
entire class of substances or hazards at a single time. It was 
hoped that such an approach would result in the more efficient 
and expeditious promulgation of standards. The "standards com-
pletion project," begun in 1974, was a generic rule making project 
that attempted to update the original health standards package. 
The generic carcinogen policy developed criteria and procedures 
for regulating carcinogenic substances. Both efforts failed. The 
standards completion project was abandoned. The generic car-
cinogen policy was challenged in the Fifth Circuit, and the court is 
holding in abeyance its decision pending OSHA reconsideration. 
It has not been followed. Although generic-type rulemaking has 
produced the access to employee exposure and medical records 
standard and the hazard communication standard, there have 
been no further efforts to promulgate generic standards for 
specific harmful substances. 
With such a broad array of reproductive hazards to be regu-
lated, the question has been raised whether it would be possible or 
desirable to promulgate a generic reproductive hazards standard. 
Dr. Corn said that it would be possible. He recommended coor-
dinating various regulatory agencies such as OSHA, Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA), Consumer Product Safety 
Administration (CPSC), EPA, and Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and also starting with a less controversial generic stan-
dard before moving to reproductive hazards.258 Dr. Finklea agreed 
with the idea of beginning with a simpler generic standard, such 
as skin irritants. He pointed out, however, that the problem with 
proposing a generic standard for reproductive hazards is the 
paucity of information.:l.59 Dr. Bingham, Dr. Infante, and Dr. Rob-
bins also supported the idea of a generic approach to reproductive 
hazards. 
One of the key issues in using such an approach is deciding 
what quantity and quality of data are needed before specific 
;ox Interview (July 3, 1984). 
~'" Telephone interview (July 6, 1984). 
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standards are issued. Dr. Halperin stated that "we need to protect 
workers on the basis of toxicological studies, rather than waiting 
for epidemiological data."~6o Dr. Ratcliffe expressed some reserva-
tions about the specifics of a generic standard. She questioned 
whether we know enough about the physiological processes of 
reproductive harms. In addition, the extrapolation techniques 
used to convert animal data to humans is not as well developed 
for reproductive hazards as it is in other areas, such as in cancer 
studies. She concluded, however, that a generic approach is "cer-
tainly theoretically possible for the future."261 
B. Risk Assessment and "Significant Risk" 
Any discussion of risk assessment under OSHA necessarily 
begins with the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Industrial 
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute.262 There, the 
Supreme Court addressed several important substantive issues in 
ruling on the validity of OSHA's benzene standard.~63 The Fifth 
Circuit had invalidated the standard because OSHA failed to 
provide a quantitative estimate of the benefits to be achieved by 
reducing the permissible exposure limit (PEL) from ten ppm to 
one ppm.264 
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on Section 3(8)'s definition of 
"occupational safety and health standard" as being "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" for safe workplaces. From this lan-
guage the court held that the Secretary must determine 
"whether the benefits expected from the standard bear a reason-
able relationship to the costs imposed by the standard."~65 The 
court was, essentially, fashioning a three-part test: (1) whether 
substantial evidence supports the Secretary's estimate of ex-
pected benefits; (2) whether substantial evidence supports the 
Secretary's estimate of expected costs; and (3) whether the ben-
efits bear a reasonable relationship to the costs. Because there 
'60 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
'61 Telephone interview (July 26, 1984). 
'"' 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
,63 This discussion is taken from M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 168, at 
71-76. 
'64 American Petrol. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 448 U.S. 607 
(1980). 
,6, [d. at 503. The court relied on its prior construction, in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978), of similar language in 
the Consumer Product Safety Act. 
680 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:627 
was inadequate evidence of expected benefits, the other issues 
were not reached. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the J41fth Circuit 
but was sharply divided and issued five separate opinions. Justice 
Stevens, writing for a plurality of four justices, rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that Section 3(8) is meaningless and is 
supplanted by Section 6(b)(5), which details the requirements for 
standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical 
agents?l6 According to the plurality opinion, Section 3(8) must be 
satisfied before there can be any consideration of a standard 
under Section 6(b)(5).267 "[Section 3(8)] requires the Secretary, be-
fore issuing any standard, to determine that it is reasonably 
necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material 
health impairment."268 In other words, "the burden was on the 
Agency to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is at 
least more likely than not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of 
benzene presents a significant risk of material impairment."269 
In effect, the plurality added a fourth element to the Fifth 
Circuit's test that had to be satisfied before the other three factors 
could even be considered. This "significant risk" requirement is 
not just an analytical starting point, it is an important substan-
tive limitation on OSHA rulemaking authority. According to the 
plurality, the Act "was not designed to require employers to 
provide absolutely risk-free workplaces," but was only intended to 
require "the elimination, as far as possible, of significant risks of 
harm."27o Therefore, the Fifth Circuit was affirmed because the 
Secretary failed to prove that there are significant risks asso-
ciated with benzene exposure at the present limits. 
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion accused the plurality of 
fashioning a restrictive rule of law from a definitional section of 
the statute which was not intended to have such a profound 
effect. The result is to place, "the burden of medical uncertainty 
squarely on the shoulders of the American worker, the intended 
beneficiary of the Occupational Safety and Health Act."271 
266 448 U.S. at 608. ' 
267 Among the requirements of § 6(b)(5), a standard must be "feasible." 
2"" 448 U.S. at 639. The court incorrectly paraphrased § 3(8) as requiring a standard to 
be "reasonably necessary and appropriate." Actually, a standard need only be "rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate." 
269 448 U.S. at 653. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 690. 
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Significantly, of the two main points of the plurality opinion, the 
effect of Section 3(8) and the sufficiency of the evidence of the 
need for a new standard, neither are majority views of the 
Court.~n Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the judgment, 
joined with the four dissenters in concluding that Section 3(8) was 
not intended to be a general check on the Secretary's authority 
under Section 6(b)(5).~73 As to the sufficiency of the evidence of the 
need for a new standard, Justice Rehnquist did not address this 
question and Justice Powell, who wrote a separate concurrence,274 
conceded that the question was close. The four dissenters argued 
that the Secretary had presented sufficient evidence of the need 
for the standard.~75 
Courts applying the API tests to other cases challenging OSHA 
standards have reached different results. In United Steelworkers 
of America v. Marshall/76 the D.C. Circuit, in upholding the valid-
ity of the lead standard, held that the Secretary had satisfied 
Section 3(8),s requirement of proving "significant harm." Instead 
of relying on "categorical assumptions" about lead poisoning, the 
Secretary amassed voluminous data of the harmful effects of lead 
at various blood-lead levels and correlated these levels with vari-
ous average air-lead levels. 
In Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall,277 how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit struck down the cottin gin standard, 
finding that the Secretary failed to prove that cotton dust poses a 
significant health risk in cotton gins. OSHA simply assumed that 
because byssinosis results from high exposure levels in textile 
mills that byssinosis also results from the lower exposure levels in 
cotton gins. This assumption did not satisfy the Section 3(8) re-
quirement of significant harm, especially in light of the seasonal 
nature of cotton gin operations. 
'n See generally Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1127 (1981). 
m 448 U.S. at 681. In his view, § 6(b)(5) was too vague and therefore represented an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive. 
'74 448 U.S. at 667. Justice Powell believed that the Secretary failed to prove the 
economic feasibility of the standard. 
", For criticism of the Court's decision, see M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 168, at 73-74; 
Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An Essay on Legal Decision-
making Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw.U.L. REV. 583 (1983); Rodgers, Judicial Review of 
Risk Assessments: The Role of Decison Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 
ENVTL. L. 301 (1981); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 193, at 84-87. 
"6 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
m 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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An important part of risk assessment and "significant risk" is 
the quality of the scientific data upon which the risk assessment 
is based. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act provides that standards dealing 
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents must be based on 
the "best available evidence."278 While this language appears to be 
straightforward, the scientific evidence of the precise harmful 
effects of exposure to various substances is often inadequate, 
incomplete, inconclusive, or subject to dispute. At the same time, 
there may be clear evidence that exposure at some levels to these 
substances causes serious illness.279 This dilemma has raised two 
related questions in the context of Section 6(b)(5): (1) What consti-
tutes the "best available evidence?"; and (2) Is OSHA precluded 
from adopting new standards until there is definitive, detailed, 
and indisputable scientific evidence? 
In the benzene case, the Secretary argued that because there is 
no absolutely safe level known for benzene, the burden should be 
on the industry to show that there is a safe level for benzene 
exposure. Any other approach, it was argued, would require 
OSHA to wait for deaths to occur before taking any action.280 
The plurality opinion specifically rejected this argument and, as 
discussed previously, held that OSHA had the burden of proving 
that it is at least more likely than not that long term exposure to 
benzene at the present PEL presents a significant risk of material 
health impairment. According to the plurality, this burden will 
not prevent OSHA from regulating carcinogens for the following 
reasons. First, it is OSHA's responsibility to determine, in the first 
instance, what it considers to be a significant risk. Although there 
is no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, it does have 
the obligation to find that a significant risk is present. Second, a 
standard need not be based on scientific certainty and OSHA is 
free to risk error on the side of over-protection so long as the 
standard is supported by a body of reputable scientific thought. 
Third, the relative significance of risk can be quantified in a 
number of ways other than epidemiological studies, such as by 
extrapolation of animal test data.281 
"" 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 
~79 See generally McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative 
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 
GEO. L.J. 729 (1979). 
'"0 44~ U.S. at 652. 
~HI 448 U.S. at 656-58. 
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In Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall,282 the 
Fifth Circuit held that the cotton gin standard was not based on 
the best available evidence. OSHA based the standard on foreign 
studies of ginning employees in Egypt, Uganda, Greece, and Su-
dan, rather than on a study of American gins, where there is 
reduced exposure due to the seasonal nature of the work. OSHA 
also overrelied on studies of byssinosis in the cotton manufactur-
ing industry. Finally, OSHA failed to reopen the hearing record to 
con~ider a more recent study. On this final point, it is not clear 
what the practical limits should be for imposing an ongoing duty 
on OSHA to consider new evidence, inasmuch as new scientific 
information is being discovered on a continuing basis. 
The benzene decision certainly caused OSHA to reevaluate the 
way in which scientific research is translated into regulatory 
I. I action. Nevertheless, it is not viewed as an insurmountable bar-
rier. Dr. Bingham termed the decision, "not an extraordinary 
impediment."283 Mr. Auchter referred to the risk assessment re-
quirement as "nothing but using good judgment."284 
After the benzene decision, the arsenic standard, which was 
pending before the Ninth Circuit, was remanded to OSHA for the 
completion of a risk assessment.:l85 In January 1983, OSHA pub-
lished its final risk assessment for arsenic and in so doing set forth 
its general framework for evaluating the need for a standard.286 In 
setting health standards OSHA uses a four step approach: 
(1) Risk assessments are performed where possible and con-
sidered with other relevant factors to determine whether the 
substance to be regulated poses a significant risk to workers. 
(2) OSHA considers which, if any, of the proposed standards 
being considered for that substance will substantially reduce 
the risk. 
(3) OSHA looks at the best available data to set the most 
protective exposure limit necessary to reduce significant risk 
that is both technologically and economically feasible. 
(4) OSHA considers the most cost-effective way to achieve the 
objective.287 
282 620 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980). 
283 Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
284 Telephone interview (July 30, 1984). 
2&' The standard was subsequently upheld. See ASARCO, Inc. V. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
286 48 Fed. Reg. 1864 (1983). 
287 [d. 
684 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:627 
Risk assessment, therefore, is the first step in the process of 
regulation. OSHA defines quantitative risk assessment as "an 
attempt to predict the degree of risk associated with a specific 
level of exposure. This is done either through direct observation 
or by extrapolation .... "288 Some important components of risk 
assessment are a description of the hazard, the potential expo-
sure and worker scenarios, the dose-response relationship, and a 
quantitative determination of risk.~89 
According to some published reports, there is a danger in over-
reliance on quantitative risk assessment. To begin with, the abil-
ity to generate detailed and precise mathematical models for 
hazards varies greatly. To require both detail and precision may 
be either impossible or so time-consuming that no action is taken 
on hazards clearly in need of regulatory action. (The court's re-
cent decision on the asbestos ETS is an example.) Thus, it has 
been argued that underlying policy questions should be addressed 
even without detailed quantitative models.~90 
Second, "risk assessment" should not be confused with "risk 
management," the latter being the process of evaluating alterna-
tive regulatory actions and selecting among them. Risk assess-
ment, quantitative or qualitative, cannot substitute for the value 
judgments and policy review essential to regulation. Administra-
tive actions do not hatch automatically from risk assessment 
eggs. 
C. Strategies for Control 
1. Engineering Controls and Personel Protective Equipment 
In its report, Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace, 
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) exam-
ined the concept of "hierarchy of controls."~l The basic tenet of 
the hierarchy of controls is to control the hazard as close to the 
source as possible. 
"88 48 Fed. Reg. at 1867 (1983). 
"89 See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A REVIEW OF RISK ASSESS-
MENT METHODOLOGIES, prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Tech-
nology, House Committee on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 
1983). 
"90 See Cranor, Epidemiology and Procedural Protections for Workplace Health in the 
Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 372 (1983). 
"91 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY IN THE 
WORKPLACE ch. 9 (1985). 
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In general, the order [of controls] is described as: engineering 
controls, work practice controls, and personal protective 
equipment (p.p.e.). Sometimes administrative controls are in-
cluded at the same order as either engineering controls or 
work practice controls. But in all cases, personal protective 
equipment is listed as the control of last resort.292 
685 
According to the OTA report, personal protective equipment is 
a last line of defense when engineering controls are infeasible, 
insufficiently protective, or not yet installed. 
The problems of p.p.e. arise out of (1) limitations in perfor-
mance, (2) difficulties in evaluating their performance, and (3) 
problems and burdens associated with their use, and the 
physical burdens they create.293 
Engineering controls have the advantage of being easier to moni-
tor to determine performance, are more reliable, enhance the 
development of new control and production technology, and do 
not create employee burdens. The main advantage of personal 
protective equipment is that it is usually significantly less expen-
sive than engineering controls. 
In February 1983, OSHA issued an advance notice of proposed 
rule making, stating its intention to reexamine its policy of giving 
priority to engineering controls.294 Specifically, OSHA stated its 
four objectives as follows: 
1. To explore whether a revised policy will allow employers to 
institute more cost-effective compliance strategies. 
2. To investigate whether advances in respirator design, 
technology and applications may permit increased reliance 
on respirators. 
3. To attempt to identify processes, operations and circum-
stances appropriate for particular compliance strategies. 
4. To assess actual workplace conditions and employee health 
in industries and operations employing different compliance 
strategies.295 
In comments submitted to OSHA, employers and trade associa-
tions supported a change in OSHA policy to allow for personal 
protective equipment to substitute for engineering controls. 
Comments from NIOSH, health and safety professionals working 
for universities and government agencies, and labor unions sup-
"9' [d. 
'93 [d. 
,"4 48 Fed. Reg. 7474 (1983). 
'95 [d. 
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ported a continuation of OSHA's preference for engineering con-
trols. In the preamble to the ethylene oxide standard OSHA 
specifically restated the agency's policy of favoring the hierarchy 
of controls approach. 
2. Medical Removal Protection 
OSHA's statutory authority to use medical removal protection 
(MRP) as a strategy for control was discussed previously. Assum-
ing such authority exists, the next question is whether MRP is a 
viable strategy for control of reproductive hazards. 
The starting point for considering this issue is OSHA's lead 
standard. The standard set a PEL of fifty micrograms per cubic 
meter of air averaged over an eight-hour period and an action 
level of thirty micrograms.~96 In addition, employees with blood-
lead levels at or above fifty micrograms per one-hundred grams of 
whole blood (or who had symptoms of lead disease) are subject to 
medical removal.~97 
In its preamble to the final lead standard, OSHA indicated that: 
To minimize the risk of genetic damage, menstrual disorders, 
interference with sexual function, lowered fertility, difficul-
ties in conception, damage to the fetus during pregnancy, 
spontaneous miscarriage, stillbirth, toxic effects on the new-
born, and problems with the development of the newborn or 
developing child, blood-lead levels should be kept below 
30ug/100g in both males and females exposed to lead who 
wish to plan pregnancies.2g8 
Despite this language, the standard's PEL and MRP require-
ments contemplate that when full compliance is achieved the 
average blood-lead levels of workers will be thirty-five ug.:l99 The 
Act's feasibility requirement, however, prevented OSHA from 
promulgating a stricter standard.3°O Reproductive effects were to 
be minimized, according to OSHA, by the thirty ug/m3 action level, 
medical surveillance, and employee education.301 Moreover, the 
standard's medical surveillance guidelines suggests that "the 
physician might recommend special protective measures or medi-
'96 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c). 
m [d. § 1910.1025(k). 
'9H 43 Fed. Reg. 52,960 (1978). 
'99 [d. at 52,966. 
300 [d. 
301 [d. 
30' 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 App. C (1984). 
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cal removal for an employee who is pregnant or who is planning to 
concei ve a child . . . . "30~ 
Can optional MRP under the lead standard prevent reproduc-
tive harms? Is optional or mandatory MRP for pregnant workers 
or male and female workers attempting to parent children a 
feasible control strategy? The experts interviewed were doubtful 
about MRP for a variety of reasons. 
In many ways, lead is one of the best substances for medical 
removal because the effects of lead are largely reversible with a 
discontinuation of exposure. But, MRP as a reproductive hazards 
control strategy, even for lead, is not entirely satisfactory. Dr. 
Ratcliffe points out that there is a "rebound effect" of blood-lead 
levels after removal or chelation, where the levels will often go 
back up without further exposure after an initial drop. In addi-
tion, because of low calcium levels during pregnancy, lead stored 
in bones and other tissues may reenter the bloodstream. Finally, 
MRP would not prevent the mutagenic effects that already had 
occurred.303 
Some individuals interviewed said that, in some situations, 
MRP could be a valuable strategy to use for substances other 
than lead. Dr. Bingham suggested that MRP might be a feasible 
strategy, but it would depend on the substance and whether there 
is irreversible damage.304 Dr. Halperin said that MRP is feasible, 
but only for certain hazards, such as nurses exposed to rubella.305 
Dr. Robbins commented that, at best, MRP is an interim measure 
to be used while engineering controls are being developed. He 
added that it may be useful specifically because it is an expensive 
measure and therefore creates an incentive to implement con-
trols.306 
Other individuals interviewed expressed even greater reluc-
tance to use MRP, mostly because of a lack of research on repro-
ductive hazards. Dr. Yodaiken said that he would be "very reluc-
tant" to use MRP on a universal basis. In his view, "it may be 
inappropriate because of a lack of good scientific evidence."307 Dr. 
Landrigan agreed that MRP "is not the way to go" and "it is 
better to clean up the workplace." He stated that "to justify 
[MRP] we would need to undertake a great deal of additional 
303 Telephone interview (July 26, 1984). 
304 Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
305 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
306 Interview (July 25, 1984). 
307 Interview (July 11, 1984). 
688 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:627 
research on reproductive effects."30H Dr. Finklea also expressed his 
personal view that we do not know enough now to use this ap-
proach.309 Finally, Dr. Infante stated that MRP would be valuable 
only where the effects were transplacental. Moreover, he added 
that mutagenicity has been very poorly studied and that a fair 
number of teratogens are also mutagens. He concluded that "con-
tainment is a better strategy."310 
D. Feasibility 
1. Technological 
The congressional purpose of the Act, to assure safe and health-
ful workplaces, is qualified by the phrase "so far as possible."311 
This language indicates that the Secretary must promulgate 
standards that are technologically achievable. Even before a 
standard is proposed, OSHA considers whether it is feasible, and 
in so doing may modify an "absolute" standard recommended by 
NIOSH or another body. Nevertheless, a standard may be pro-
mulgated that contemplates vast improvements in safety and 
health technology. 
Section 6(b)(5), which applies to new standards regulating toxic 
substances or harmful physical agents, contains two references to 
the requirement of feasibility. First, in promulgating standards 
under Section 6(b)(5), the Secretary "shall set the standard which 
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, ... that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health .... "31~ Second, in 
addition to the attainment of the highest degree of protection for 
employees, "other considerations shall be ... the feasibility of the 
standards .... "313 
In Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,314 the man-
ufacturers of vinyl chloride and vinyl chloride products contended 
that compliance with the required exposure level of the vinyl 
chloride standard was not technologically feasible. The Second 
Circuit rejected this contention and indicated that the defense of 
308 Interview (July 10, 1984) . 
. '09 Telephone interview (July 6, 1984). 
310 Interview (July 3, 1984). 
311 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). 
312 Id. § 655(b)(5). 
313 Id. 
314 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl 
Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 497 (1978). 
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technological infeasibility requires the showing that a standard is 
"clearly impossible of attainment." The court stated that "the 
Secretary is not restricted by the status quo. He may raise stan-
dards which require the improvements in existing technologies or 
which require the development of new technology .... "315 
Similar reasoning was used by the Third Circuit in AFL-CIO v. 
Brennan,316 although the court reached the opposite result. In 
ruling on the feasibility of a mechanical power press standard, the 
court declared that "at least to a limited extent, OSHA is to be 
viewed as a technology-forcing piece of legislation."317 Neverthe-
less, the court found that compliance with the standard was not 
technologically feasible "in the near future."318 
Decisions of the courts of appeals have attempted to clarify the 
"technology-forcing" language first used inAFL-CIO v. Brennan. 
In American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA/19 the Third Circuit 
indicated that even though the Secretary may require an em-
ployer "to implement technology 'looming on today's horizon,' ... 
the statute does not permit the Secretary to place an affirmative 
duty on each employer to research and develop new technol-
ogy."3~O According to the court, this is especially true when the 
research and development provisions are speculative and render 
any assessment of feasibility practically impossible. 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,:m the D.C. Cir-
cuit delineated OSHA's burden of proving technological feasibil-
ity. "OSHA's duty is to show that modern technology has at least 
conceived some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to 
be capable of meeting the PEL and which the industries are 
generally capable of adopting."3~~ The court's limited role in decid-
ing whether this burden has been met was set out in the D.C. 
Circuit's opinion in AFL-CIO v. Marshall:3~3 
31.; 509 F.2d at 1309. 
316 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). 
317 Id. at 121 (footnote omitted). 
31" Id. at 122. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 479-80 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
319 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cen. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (coke oven emissions 
standard). 
320 577 F.2d at 838. See 47 CIN. L. REV. 477 (1978). 
3"1 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
""" Id. 
3"3 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afi'd sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 
452 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton dust standard). 
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Judging the technological feasibility of a particular agency 
goal is beyond the expertise of the judiciary especially where 
the assessment involves predictions of technological changes. 
Instead, our task on review is to find whether the agency 
sufficiently supported its feasibility determination with ma-
terial in the record.324 
The issue of technological feasibility could arise if OSHA at-
tempted to require the use of engineering controls to reduce 
exposure to levels that would not be harmful to the reproductive 
health of any workers or their offspring. Because of evidence 
suggesting that extremely low levels of exposure could be harm-
ful, it might be asserted that it is technologically infeasible to 
achieve the required reductions in exposure levels. 
2. Economic 
A related argument that is likely to be raised is that it is 
economically infeasible to reduce exposures to the levels where no 
reproductive harms would occur. 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan 
(ATMI) ,'&5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
Act requires the Secretary, in promulgating a standard under 
Section 6(b)(5), to determine that the costs of the standard bear a 
reasonable relationship to its benefits. The Fifth Circuit, in the 
benzene case,'&6 had imposed such a requirement. The D.C. Cir-
cuit, however, in the cotton dust327 and lead'&8 cases had rejected 
this view.'&9 
In a five-to-three decision,330 the Court rejected the argument 
that the Act requires the use of cost-benefit analysis. Relying on 
the plain meaning of the word "feasible" as "capable of being 
m 617 F.2d at 656. 
'325 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
326 American Petrol. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't V. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
327 AFL-CIO V. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afl'd sub nom. American 
Textile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. V. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
328 United Steelworkers of America V. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
329 See also American Iron & Steel Inst. V. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 836 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. 
dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (upholding validity of coke oven emissions standard despite 
an annual compliance cost of $240 million). 
330 Justice Powell took no part in the decision, but in his concurring opinion in the 
benzene case, he indicated that he would require cost-benefit analysis. Thus, as to this 
issue, it would appear that the Court is divided five-to-four. Justice Stewart, since 
replaced by Justice O'Connor, voted with the dissent in cotton dust. 
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done," the Court ruled that imposing a cost-benefit requirement 
would be inconsistent with the mandate of Congress. 
Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs 
and benefits, by placing the "benefit" of worker health above 
all other considerations save those making attainment of this 
"benefit" unachievable .... Thus, cost-benefit analysis by 
OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility anal-
ysis is.3.11 
The Court observed that when Congress has intended that an 
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated 
such an intent on the face of the statute.332 Neither the language 
of OSHA nor its legislative history indicate such a congressional 
intent. Moreover, the general definitional language of Section 3(8) 
cannot be used to impose a cost-benefit requirement and thereby 
"eviscerate" the "to the extent feasible" language of Section 
6(b)(5).333 
According to the majority opinion of Justice Brennan, "feasible" 
as used in Section 6(b)(5), includes economic feasibility. After re-
viewing the record, the Court concluded that the D.C. Circuit did 
not err in holding that the Secretary's findings that compliance 
with the cotton dust standard was economically feasible was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Even though no specific economic 
studies were performed on the final standard, there were studies 
that showed that compliance with a stricter and more costly 
standard was feasible.334 
In a separate diss~nt, Justice Stewart argued that OSHA failed 
to justify its estimate of the costs of the cotton dust standard 
because it did not have any estimates of the cost of the final 
version of the standard.335 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, reiterated his view from the benzene case that Sec-
tion 6(b)(5) represents an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority to the executive.336 
Two further points relative to the cotton dust case are worthy of 
mention. First, the holding is limited to Section 6(b)(5) standards; 
the Court did not address the issue of whether cost-benefit analy-
sis is required in promulgating other types of standards.337 Second, 
331 452 U.S. at 509 (footnote omitted). 
33' ld. at 510. 
3.13 ld. at 513. 
334 I d. at 522-36. 
335 I d. at 542. 
336 ld. at 547. 
337 ld. at 509 n.29. 
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despite assertions to the contrary,338 the Secretary is not even 
permitted to engage in cost-benefit analysis in promulgating 
standards pursuant to Section 6(b)(5). Besides feasibility analysis, 
"Congress did not contemplate any further balancing by the 
agency for toxic material and harmful physical agents standards 
"339 
After the cotton dust decision, OSHA indicated that it would not 
engage in cost-benefit analysis, but that it would use cost-
effectiveness analysis. While the former would consider whether 
the benefits of a regulation are sufficient to outweigh its costs, the 
latter is concerned with the most efficient way of attaining a 
certain level of protection. 
E. Jurisdictional Problems 
One possible way of addressing the problem of reproductive 
hazards in the workplace is for OSHA to attempt to regulate the 
permissible range of an employer's options relating to employee 
exposure. For example, OSHA might promulgate a standard pro-
hibiting an employer from excluding women from areas where 
there is exposure to known or suspected abortifacient, mutagenic, 
teratogenic, or embryofetotoxic substances. The promulgation of 
such a regulation would raise the legal issue of whether OSHA 
had exceeded its statutory authority. 
Although the courts have not addressed the issue of OSHA's 
authority to promulgate a standard prohibiting exclusionary em-
ployment practices, some analogous issues have arisen in cases 
involving medical removal protection (MRP) and rate retention 
(RR). MRP is simply the removal of employees from further 
hazardous exposure to a toxic substance until it is medically 
advisable to return. RR requires that the removed employee's 
wages and benefits be maintained during the period of removal. 
MRP and RR provisions in OSHA health standards have be-
come increasingly stringent. For example, the vinyl chloride 
standard (promulgated in 1974) provides for MRP, but not RR.340 
The asbestos standard (promulgated in 1972) provides for MRP of 
employees for whom respirators are ineffective, but RR is re-
quired only if there is an available position.341 The cotton dust 
338 Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissentin~). 
339 Id. at 513. 
340 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k)(5) (1984). 
341 Id. § 1910.1001(d)(2)(iv)(c). 
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standard (promulgated in 1978), however, squarely raised the 
issue of OSHA authority. 
The cotton dust standard342 placed heavy reliance on the use of 
respirators to protect employees from exposure to cotton dust, 
particularly during the four-year interim period given employers 
to install engineering controls. One part of the respirator provi-
sion requires employers to give employees unable to wear a re-
spirator - because of facial irritation, severe discomfort, or im-
paired breathing - the opportunity to transfer to another posi-
tion, if available, where the dust level meets the standard's per-
missible exposure limit (PEL).343 When such a transfer occurs the 
employer must guarantee that the employee's wages and benefits 
are maintained.344 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,345 
the Supreme Court, without deciding the issue of whether OSHA 
could impose MRP and RR requirements at all, struck down this 
RR provision because OSHA "failed to make the necessary de-
termination or statement of reasons that its wage guarantee 
requirement is related to the achievement of a safe and healthful 
work environment."346 Rather than explaining the RR provision 
as being essential in ensuring that workers would seek needed 
MRP, OSHA had stated that the "goal of this provision is to 
minimize any adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue 
of the inability to wear a respirator."347 The Court dismissed 
OSHA's statement of the importance of encouraging employees to 
disclose symptoms of disease - expressed in its brief before the 
Court - as unacceptable "post-hoc rationalizations."348 
The Court's most instructive statement on the permissible 
scope of OSHA rule making is the following: 
Because the Act in no way authorizes OSHA to repair gen-
eral unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achieve-
ment of health and safety goals, we conclude that OSHA 
acted beyond statutory authority when it issued the wage 
guarantee regulation.349 
342 Id. § 1910.1043. 
343 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(fX2)(v). 
344 Id. 
3 .. , 452 u.S. 490 (1981). 
346 I d. at 537-38. 
347 Id. at 538 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 27,387, col. 3 (1978)). 
348 I d. at 539. 
349 Id. at 540 (footnote omitted). 
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When OSHA subsequently promulgated its new lead standard 
in 1978, it included an even broader MRP and RR provision. 
Employees with blood-lead levels above the specified limit and 
those employees showing symptoms of lead disease must be re-
moved until their blood-lead has returned to an acceptable level. 
The employer may transfer the employee to a non-lead plan~, 
low-lead area of a plant, or may keep the employee in a high-lead 
area for a shorter work week. When an employee is removed in 
any way the employee retains his or her earnings rate, seniority, 
and benefit levels for up to eighteen months and upon return 
must be restored to his or her original job status.350 
Unlike its statement of reasons accompanying the cotton dust 
standard, the lead standard contained detailed findings of the 
need for RR. OSHA found "that unless workers were guaranteed 
all their wage and seniority rights upon removal, they would 
resist cooperating with the medical surveillance program that 
determined the need for removal, since they reasonably might 
fear being fired or sent to lower-paying jobs if they revealed 
dangerously high blood-lead levels."351 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,352 the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the validity of the MRP and RR provision. The lead 
industry argued that Congress did not intend to have MRP and 
RR under OSHA because the Act is silent on this subject,353 while 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (CMHSA),354 passed 
the year before OSHA, contained an MRP provision. The court 
rejected this argument, noting that the CMHSA covered a single 
industry and was drafted with much greater specificity than 
OSHA.355 The lead industry next argued that the provision vio-
lated Section 4(b)(4),s prohibition on OSHA interfering with work-
ers' compensation. Although acknowledging the "seriousness" of 
this argument, the court noted the limited duration and scope (for 
example, there is no payment for medical expenses) of RR be-
nefits, and indicated that the group of workers to benefit from this 
provision will become increasingly smaller as the PEL is low-
ered.356 "We conclude that though MRP may indeed have a great 
3.;0 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (k)(l). 
3';1 United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(citing 43 Fed. Reg. 54,442-46 (1978», cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
352 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
3';3 647 F.2d at 1232. 
354 Id. 
"''' Id. 
356 Id. at 1234. 
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practical effect on workmen's compensation claims, it leaves the 
state schemes wholly intact as a legal matter, and so does not 
violate Section 4(b)(4)."357 Finally, the court rejected the argument 
that MRP with RR violates the national labor policy of allowing 
all substantive provisions of labor management relations to be 
left to collective bargaining.358 Simply because earnings protection 
is a mandatory subject of bargaining and could be adopted 
through collective bargaining does not mean OSHA has no au-
thority to mandate such a program. 
The D.C. Circuit's opinion contains a footnote with particular 
relevance to the issue of MRP and reproductive hazards: 
Amici representing public interest law organizations and 
California state labor agencies have argued that MRP is not 
only legally valid under the OSH Act, but is legally required 
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 
2000e et seq. (1976 & Supp. II 1978). They argue that without 
MRP employers will discriminate against fertile women - to 
whom lead exposure poses an even greater threat than it 
does to other workers - by excluding them from all lead-
exposed jobs at the outset. A review of an OSHA proceeding, 
however, is not the place to address hypothetical Title VII 
questions, and in any event we think fertile women can find 
statutory protection from such discrimination in the OSH 
Act's own requirement that OSHA standards ensure that "no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health ***." 29 
U.S.C. Section 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).:J,';9 
When read together, the cotton dust and lead cases suggest the 
following about OSHA regulation of reproductive hazards: 
1. OSHA has the statutory authority to protect male work-
ers, female workers, and fetuses.360 
2. OSHA could promulgate a standard setting exposure 
levels where male workers, female workers, and fetuses 
would not suffer harm, so long as the standard met all of the 
requirements of Sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5), such as "significant 
risk," and technological and economic feasibility. 
3. OSHA might well be precluded from promulgating a 
regulation prohibiting the exclusion of all women from expo-
sure to reproductive hazards. Such rulemaking may be held 
to be preempted by Title VII, or might be held to be an 
3.'7 [d. at 1236. 
:,," [d. 
30" [d. at 1238 n.74 (emphasis in original). 
360 [d. at 1256 n.96. 
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attempt "to repair general unfairness unrelated to achieve-
ment of health and safety goals."361 
4. OSHA probably would not be precluded from promulgat-
ing a regulation prohibiting an employer from making 
sterilization of current employees (male employees, female 
employees, or all employees) a condition of continued em-
ployment. Valid health and safety goals would seem to in-
clude prohibiting both exposure to sterilizing agents and 
"voluntary" sterilization in order to retain employment. 
Note: An employer policy requiring that all employees be 
sterilized might not violate Title VII. It is not clear whether 
OSHA has the authority to promulgate a regulation prohibit-
ing an employer from hiring only employees who had been 
sterilized or were otherwise incapable of reproduction. Such a 
regulation might be upheld based on the same considerations 
as are applicable to current employees. 
5. The promulgation of an OSHA standard prohibiting an 
employer from refusing to hire fertile women would entail 
elements of both considerations 3 and 4. The legality of such 
rulemaking may ultimately turn on the state of the factual 
record developed at the rule making, including evidence 
whether prohibiting the employment of fertile women causes 
women to become sterilized. 
The purely employment discrimination aspects of reproductive 
hazards are beyond the scope of this Article. OSHA's attempts to 
regulate reproductive hazards, however, invariably have raised 
employment discrimination issues. For example, the American 
Cyanamid case, in which OSHA attempted to use Section 5(a)(l) 
to prohibit an employer's policy of excluding all fertile women 
from working where there was exposure to lead, was discussed 
earlier. 
In 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) issued joint Proposed Interpre-
tive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive 
Hazards.362 The Guidelines, issued pursuant to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246, were pro-
posed to address the fact that an "increasing number of employ-
ers and contractors ... are initiating policies excluding all women 
of childbearing capacity from certain jobs because of exposure to 
hazardous substances or conditions."363 
36' 452 U.S. at 541. 
362 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980). 
36., ld. 
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The Guidelines permit the "temporary emergency exclusion" of 
employees of only one sex or of pregnant employees under limited 
circumstances, including where there is proof of a hazard to one 
sex or the fetus, but not to the other sex.364 The Guidelines do not 
address the issue, however, of how the emergency exclusion is 
triggered. For example, there is no discussion of whether an 
employer may require women employees to take perodic preg-
nancy tests. 
The Guidelines prohibit altogether any reproductive hazards 
policies applicable to only one sex.365 Facially neutral policies that 
adversely impact one sex must be justified "in accordance with 
relevant legal principles." (Presumably, this means establishing a 
business necessity or job-relatedness defense.) The Guidelines do 
not give any examples of such neutral policies. 
The proposal was met with numerous comments and great 
controversy. On January 13, 1981, the Proposed Guidelines were 
withdrawn.366 According to Eleanor Holmes Norton,367 former 
chair of EEOC, one of the main problems with the reproductive 
hazards rulemaking, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of 
the joint proposal of EEOC and OFCCP, was the lack of a consen-
sus in the scientific evidence received in response to the proposal. 
Without such a consensus it was considered to be virtually impos-
sible to issue a final regulation dealing with this complex and 
controversial subject. 
The Proposed Guidelines contemplated an active role for OSHA 
in "consultation and coordination" with EEOC and OFCCP. 
NIOSH and OSHA research also was contemplated. Former 
OSHA administrators Dr. Morton Corn and Thorne Auchter had 
considerable reservations about such OSHA involvement. They 
asserted that OSHA lacked the statutory authority, resources, or 
expertise to become involved in discrimination claims. Dr. Eula 
Bingham, who as head of OSHA, was instrumental in getting the 
Proposed Guidelines issued, disagreed. In her view, OSHA has 
"inherent responsibility" in this area; OSHA should lend techni-
cal support and assistance to EEOC and NIOSH.366 Neither 
OSHA, EEOC, nor OFCCP, however, have any current plans to 
reconsider rule making in this area. 
364 45 Fed. Reg. 7517 (1980). 
365 Id. at 7516. 
366 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981). 
367 Interview (July 1, 1984). 
368 Telephone interview (July 23, 1984). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Promulgating any new OSHA health standard is extremely 
difficult. It depends on a good working relationship between 
NIOSH and OSHA, adequate budgets and personnel for each 
agency, and insulation of the decision makers from the political 
pressures that invariably arise when new regulations are pro-
posed. The rulemaking process is protracted, detailed, cumber-
some, resource draining, and adversarial. The reviewing courts 
have required detailed analyses of significant risk and technolog-
ical and economic feasibility. The courts also have shown a reluc-
tance to uphold the validity of emergency temporary standards, 
and have required, at times, a precise and an almost cataclysmic 
showing of "grave danger." 
Only three current OSHA health standards, those for DBCP, 
lead, and ethylene oxide, specifically attempt to protect workers 
from reproductive hazards. The prospects are unclear for new 
standards or more stringent modifications of existing standards 
to protect reproductive health. A number of problems exist. There 
is a lack of scientific research presently available on reproductive 
hazards in the workplace, in part because of an historical lack of 
interest in this field at OSHA, NIOSH, the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), and the Public Health Service (PHS). There are 
also problems with methodologies for new studies, such as the 
need to develop better models for extrapolating animal data to 
humans and the ongoing problem of cohort selection. 
With so many unregulated reproductive hazards and the pros-
pect of new substances being introduced at a faster rate than 
regulations can be issued at the present pace, the question has 
been raised whether a generic reproductive hazards standard is 
possible. Such a policy would establish the framework for regulat-
ing a variety of substances and would, presumably, allow for more 
efficient and expeditious standards promulgation. Although 
many individuals interviewed supported the idea in principle, 
there are potential scientific, legal, and political stumbling blocks. 
Another problem with reproductive hazards standards is that 
the fetus and the reproductive systems of both males and females 
are often affected by relatively low exposure levels - well below 
that which would otherwise harm an adult. Reducing exposure 
levels to protect such sensitive individuals and fetuses may, argu-
ably, be technologically or economically infeasible. 
An additional strategy for dealing with reproductive hazards is 
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the medical removal of workers who were attempting to parent 
children or who were pregnant. Scientifically, this approach 
would be valuable for only a limited number of hazards, primarily 
where the only effects were transplacental. Moreover, an expan-
sive use of medical removal, especially if used to protect employ-
ment rights generally and not just worker health, would raise a 
number of difficult legal problems. 
The prospects for regulating reproductive hazards under 
OSHA, however, should not be viewed as totally bleak. Our scien-
tific understanding of the toxicology, physiology, teratology and 
other important disciplines affecting reproduction is expanding. 
Our capabilities to implement increasingly effective and efficient 
controls are growing. The awareness of reproductive hazards as 
an important occupational health problem is heightening. New 
regulatory strategies could be developed to bring about reason-
able, effective regulation of reproductive hazards under OSHA. 
These new strategies also are essential if there is to be effective 
regulation of the numerous other kinds of occupational safety and 
health hazards. 
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